McLaughlin Chiropractic Assoc. v. McKesson Corp. (23-1226)
argument 23-1226McLaughlin Chiropractic Assoc. v. McKesson Corp.
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 13m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 1 month ago
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What is the Hobbes Act and how does it limit district courts’ review of agency orders?
Your argument next in case twenty three twelve twenty six, McLaughlin Cairo practic associates. uh against MacKesson Corporation. Mr Wessler. Thank you, Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Five years ago in PDR Network, four justices recognized that properly construed, the Hobbes Act does not require district courts to treat agency orders that interpret Federal statutes as binding precedent. Instead, it operates just like other pre enforcement channeling statutes by providing for direct review of agency orders in the Courts of Appeals. McKesson and the government reject this view. Together they urge an interpretation that would bind courts, including this one, to agency interpretations of federal statutes no matter how wrong.
And that would be true even for interpretive rules that by definition do not carry the force of law. transforming even the most informal agency interpretations into permanently binding ones. But none of the relevant markers, text, context, structure, and history support such a misguided and possibly unconstitutional reading of the Hobbes Act. The key phrase determine the validity of authorises courts of appeals to determine whether an order is legally in effect, and a court does this by issuing a declaratory judgment that the order is valid or invalid. Context cinches this. The phrase is immediately surrounded by terms which all denote specific forms of equitable relief directed against the order itself.
The phrase determine the validity of should therefore be read the same way. The Act's broader structure reinforces this understanding. From beginning to end, it establishes procedures designed to govern direct review proceedings and elsewhere uses the phrase determine the validity of uh to mean a declaratory judgment. And finally, there's history. The Act was never intended to implicate actions between private parties. Instead, it was patterned on similar statutes established for the review of orders from other agencies that have never been thought to bind district courts. Consistent with the longstanding recognition that interpreting statutes is a job for the judiciary, This Court should construe the Hobbes Act for what it is, a commonplace jurisdictional provision that allows parties to obtain equitable relief directly against agency orders in the courts of appeals.
I welcome the Court's questions. I think the Port of Boston case is different for a couple of reasons, Justice Thomas, but most importantly, in that case, both parties uh that were involved uh in the district court were also involved uh in the regulatory proceeding seeking uh petition for review. And I think in that scenario um where you've got two parties that are specifically bound by uh an agency action, you've got normal estoppel principles uh issue preclusion principles that would apply. But we're not really talking about a situation.
The Court could have easily said that race collateral estoppel principles apply But it didn't. It said the court said that the act is explicit, that the district court was without authority to review the merits of the Commission's decision. So you have a problem that the that the analysis that the court uses is directly contrary to your
But I think the diff the difference, Your Honor, i in in in that case for compared with what we have here is you've got a situation where the parties at our are fighting about the meaning of the agency interpretation were also parties in the agency proceeding itself. Here you don't have a situation where the plaintiffs in this case had any role to play or had any uh were involved at all.
You haven't denied they had an opportunity
Well well we we don't deny that that in theory they had an opportunity. No
not in theory. They they the pre this is an unusual case. where the proceeding was actually in effect during the litigation. Um, in my experience, and I think we've said this, Uh if there is something like that happening, the district court The court below should stay letting that decision become final.
I think, Your Honor, that illustrates what kind of empty promise the uh the my friends on the other side's interpretation would have for the Hobbes Act, because you are right, what happened here was the litigation was proceeding for six years and the agency then issued this a merefactors order.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Hobbes Act and how does it limit district courts’ review of agency orders?
0:00–9:59
2
How do the parties argue about whether the FCC’s Amerifactors order is an interpretive rule or a binding adjudication?
9:59–19:35
3
What precedents (Port of Boston, PDR Network, Yakus) do the Justices cite to interpret “determine the validity”?
19:35–28:06
4
Why does the government claim the Hobbes Act’s exclusivity applies to any agency action with legal effect?
28:06–38:46
5
How does the petition for adequacy under § 703 affect a party’s ability to challenge an agency order?
38:46–46:41
6
What are the arguments about collateral estoppel and pre‑enforcement review in private‑party disputes?
46:41–53:48
7
How do the Justices address due‑process concerns if a party missed the six‑day petition window?
53:48–1:04:07
8
What relief does each side seek from the Supreme Court—reversal, narrow reading, or broader application of the Hobbes Act?
1:04:07–1:13:52