McQuiggin v. Perkins (12-126)
argument 12-126McQuiggin v. Perkins
Supreme Court of the United States
58 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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What is the one‑year filing deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 2244‑D1D and why does it matter?
We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 12-126, McGuigan v. Perkins. Mr. Bursch.
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. We're not dealing here with the situation where a prisoner is trying to gather new evidence. EDPA has a tolling rule to take care of that problem. We're also not dealing with anything that prevents a petitioner from filing, because that's the problem you solved in Holland. What we have here is the question of when a petitioner must file his federal habeas petition or when he has the evidence and there are no barriers to filing. And 2244-D1D addresses that exact question. It says within one year. Now, Mr. Perkins asks for a fairly dramatic expansion of Holland. What he wants is equitable abrogation with no diligence, no fault, or any other factor.
And our primary position is that you should simply apply the plain language of 2244-D1D. Mr. Birch, I
thought that... Perkins, didn't he say that you could take into account — I'm looking for the brief — you could take into account delay as a factor in whether his actual innocence gateway plea should be heard?
Well, he does say that, and we read that as a concession, that sometimes if you wait too long, that can actually trump a claim of actual innocence. And so at a minimum, our alternative position is that you have to act with diligence.
That's not quite what he's saying. We've had a miscarriage of justice exception for as long as there's been a habeas statute. We've applied it repeatedly. It's not that it trumps it, but that it puts into doubt the evidence you're claiming, proves your actual innocence. It's not the sort of situation where, as reasonable due diligence will do, which is to override even an actually innocent person, what he says is it really puts into question the validity of your claims.
Justice Sotomayor, it represents the same kind of principle. You've got to act quickly or adverse consequences can happen. But what diligence does that his rule doesn't do is it recognizes this compelling, countervailing state interest in having notice and an opportunity to investigate evidence as soon as it's discovered. And the problem here, we don't have any issue at all if it takes 10, 15, 100 years to find new evidence. But once he has that evidence, the burden is on him to come forward so that the state has the opportunity to To investigate.
It's a small point and doesn't go to the general issues you have to discuss with us. But just on the small point, he gets, I forget exactly the detail, he gets an affidavit that Jones did it within a year. He has one.
Yes.
Now, if I were the person, I'd say, you know, this one might not work. Maybe I can get two. And then he gets a second, which makes a certain amount of sense to me, although a substantial period of time elapses. And the same thing happens with the third. It makes sense to me that the prisoner might try to wait for the third. How does that factor into your diligence, assuming we get there?
Yes, Justice Kennedy, there's a very simple solution to that problem. If he gets close to the end of his year and he thinks that that next affidavit might be just around the corner but he doesn't have it yet, all he has to do is file a protective habeas petition with the district court, ask for a stay, and say, I'm still diligently pursuing what I think is going to be another affidavit. And if he can't find that next affidavit, you litigate it on the merits. And if he does, then he amends his petition, and then you hear it.
I'm not quite sure that wouldn't mean that you have a whole raft of petitions, protective decisions waiting on the shelves in the district court. That has its own congestion problems in the district court, it seems to me.
Two thoughts on that. First, we already see this in the exhaustion area. There are petitioners who are concerned that notwithstanding statutory tolling for pursuing state remedies, that while they're monkeying around in state court, they might somehow be time-barred from bringing their federal claim. So we see this all the time in the Sixth Circuit, in Michigan in particular.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the one‑year filing deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 2244‑D1D and why does it matter?
0:01–7:35
2
How does the Court interpret “diligence” when a prisoner discovers new evidence?
7:35–16:27
3
When can a petitioner rely on the actual‑innocence (miscarriage‑of‑justice) gateway?
16:27–24:14
4
Why does the Sixth Circuit treat successive petitions differently from first petitions?
24:14–30:20
5
What legislative history did Congress provide about the limitations period and new evidence?
30:20–38:04
6
How do equitable tolling and “extraordinary” tolling differ under the EDPA framework?
38:04–44:06
7
What practical obstacles do pro se petitioners face when filing a habeas petition?
44:06–51:09
8
What is the Court’s likely next step for this case after the oral argument?
51:09–58:50