Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic (23-1275)

argument 23-1275

Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 33m 8 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 1 month ago official recording ↗
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What is the central dispute over whether the Medicaid provision creates a private right?

John G. Roberts 0:00
We'll hear argument this morning in case twenty three twelve seventy
Mr. Birch 0:03
five, Medina versus Planned Parenthood South Atlantic. Mr Birch. Thank you, Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. In our Federalist system, the legitimacy of Congress's exercise of its spending power depends on a State's knowing acceptance of funding conditions. As even respondents concede, an individual focus and mandatory language are not enough. Gonzaga held that clear rights creating language is critical to creating private rights. Congress did not use clear rights creating language in the Any Qualified Provider Provision. Consider its text and structure. First, it does not use the word right or its functional equivalent, nor does it use words with a deeply rooted rights creating pedigree like the Fifth Amendment's no person shall, that lack should be dispositive.
Mr. Birch 0:49
Second, the provision speaks merely of obtaining a benefit from a third party, unlike traditional rights creating language, which confers a right directly. Third, it would allow the regulated entity here a state to define the scope of the alleged right it is not allowed to violate by deciding which providers are qualified. Fourth, the provision does not reside in a Bill of Rights. It's one of eighty seven items on a list of plan contents that the Secretary must look for before approving a plan. Fifth, it is unusual to find a right in a substantial compliance regime where a sizable minority of beneficiaries may fail to receive the offered benefit. And finally, Congress knows how to clearly confer a private right to choose a provider, because it did so in FINRA's analogous provision, which appears in a separate Bill of Rights and uses rights-creating language connected to the beneficiary and directed to the regulated entity, a facility.
Mr. Birch 1:45
It says a nursing facility must protect and promote the rights of each resident, including the right to choose a personal attending. position. Congress did none of that here, and the Court should not read the any qualified provider provision as though Congress did. I welcome the Court's questions.
Clarence Thomas 2:03
Uh you seem to put quite a bit of uh weight on the use of the word right. Um over uh I think uh twenty times uh in Telepski. uh and the absence of the word right in this case. Uh do you think uh right is uh absolutely necessary in order to determine whether or not there a right has been created uh under uh disprovision?
Mr. Birch 2:33
I think if Congress wants to be clear, right is the best word, but we would take its functional equivalent. So for example, entitlement or privilege, other words that are functionally equivalent to right, or of course the traditional no person shall, like the Fifth Amendment. But this Court made clear in Televsky that this is a high bar, it's atypical. And so if a state is going to be on clear notice, which it has to be to know what contract it's agreeing to, it needs to be really clear.
Clarence Thomas 2:57
So how would you amend this statute to um be clear about a right?
Mr. Birch 3:02
There's a number of things that Congress could have done. For starters, it could have set it apart in a separate bill of rights, like it did in Televsky with its provider choice provision. It could have used rights-creating language. For example, a beneficiary has a right to designate her provider. It could have taken the qualifications of the provider away from the state, the regulator, and instead made it a federal issue. Or it could have even done something like Congress did in thirteen ninety six small A A eighty four B, which if you move all the way down the list to near the end, it took the regulated entity, the state, it used a rights creating shell, and it put them together in the provision.
Mr. Birch 3:42
But but none of those indicators of a clear statement is present in this provision.
Elena Kagan 3:48
Um You're not quite calling it a magic word, but you're coming very close. An example was raised in one of the briefs that says the IRS must provide that any individual may obtain a refund of overpaid taxes. It seems hard to believe that that sentence on its face does not create a right for an individual to have a refund of overpaid taxes.

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