Merrill v. Milligan (21-1086)

argument 21-1086

Merrill v. Milligan

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 53m 7 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 7 days ago official recording ↗
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What is the core dispute over Alabama’s 2021 redistricting plan?

John G. Roberts 0:00
We'll hear argument first this morning in case twenty one ten eighty six, Merrill versus Milligan, and the consolidated case. Mr Lucourt?
Andrew L. Brasher 0:11
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Alabama conducted its twenty twenty one redistricting in a lawful, race neutral manner. The state largely retained its existing districts and made changes needed to equalize population. That wasn't good enough for the plaintiffs. They argued that Section two of the Voting Rights Act requires Alabama to replace its map with a racially gerrymandered plan maximizing the number of majority minority districts. But Section two requires an electoral process equally open to all, not one that guarantees maximum political success for some over others. Section two does not and cannot obligate Alabama to abandon district lines enveloping the undisputed, longstanding community of interest in the Gulf to be replaced by district lines dividing black and white with such racial precision that Alabama could never have constitutionally drawn those lines in the first place.
Andrew L. Brasher 1:03
Yet that is what Alabama has been commanded to do here redraw its districts to subordinate traditional districting principles to race. The only way to add a second majority minority district to Alabama's plan is to make race the non negotiable criterion. Planet's illustration of plans prove the point. They offer only one way to get that second majority black district split Mobile County and divide the Gulf by race. Their new versions of Districts one and two then stretched the width of the state to group together black voters from disparate areas as far west as Mobile and as far east as the Georgia border. The district court relied on these outlier plans to invalidate the state's neutrally drawn map, and that was legal error.
Andrew L. Brasher 1:44
Requiring states to scrap neutral plans in favor of plans drawn on account of race set Section two at war with itself and with the Constitution. The Court should make clear that if a state's plan is the product of the State's neutral districting principles, the plan is equally open to all voters. Because Alabama's twenty twenty one plan is such a plan Plaintiff's claims fail. I welcome the Court's questions.
Clarence Thomas 2:10
Uh what would you use as a comparator? I I assume that your problem is that the comparator here was uh uh had race as a non as non negotiable. What would you use as a comparator if even if you uh thought that there might be some vote uh dilution problems with your plan?
Andrew L. Brasher 2:31
The the plan uh that would be The adequate comparator would be one that respects all of our traditional distinct principles as much as our own map, um, but then has some different sort of racial outcome, um similar to what the court has proposed in Cromardi II, for example. That that sort of map can actually show that there's a problem with our map. But if you are discriminating in favor of one racial group, then that map cannot show that our map was discriminated. discriminated against that group. It it's a flawed control.
Clarence Thomas 3:02
Well don't you think there's an overall problem with uh in these uh dilution cases of determining uh uh at the beginning what the comparative should be.
Andrew L. Brasher 3:13
Yes, Your Honor. I think as this court noted, both in the Holder v. Hall plurality and in Burnovich, benchmarks are critical in any Section Two case. Um and we've proposed a benchmark to the court. Uh plaintiffs have not proposed any benchmark other than perhaps maximization or proportionality, but of course Section Two rejects a proportionality baseline, and this court has wisely rejected maximization and proportionality because they lead to constitutional problems.
Elena Kagan 3:39
Do you agree that the benchmark you propose has never been recognized by this court as the benchmark that is appropriate in these kinds of cases?
Andrew L. Brasher 3:47
I I don't think so, Justice Kagan. First, I mean going back to jingles, uh it I think the benchmark there even for multimember districts was neutrally drawn single member districts, not racially gerrymandered single member districts. And then when you
Elena Kagan 3:59
continue Of course you are requiring that there be that kind of benchmark.

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