Messerschmidt v. Millender (10-704)

argument 10-704

Messerschmidt v. Millender

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 0m 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 4 days ago official recording ↗

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What constitutional standards govern qualified immunity for search warrants?

John G. Roberts 0:03

We'll hear argument next in Case 10704, Messerschmitt v. Melender. Mr. Coates.

Mr. Coates 0:09

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, in Malley v. Briggs, United States v. Leon, this Court set forth a very high standard for denying qualified immunity in the civil context or suppressing evidence in the criminal context under circumstances where a police officer has procured a warrant that is subsequently determined to be invalid. Specifically, the Court held that The initial magistrate's determination is entitled to great deference and that you'll go behind that only in cases where the officer falsified information or omitted exculpatory information, where the affidavit was bare bones or there was some indication that the judicial officer did not perform the function, and then a catch-all provision where the warrant was so lacking an indicia of probable cause that no reasonable officer could even submit it for a magistrate's determination.

Mr. Coates 1:02

And specifically in Maui, the Court said it had to be the actions of an officer that was plainly incompetent or knowingly violating the law. This case arises from a Ninth Circuit decision that we submit does not apply the Court's standards. Under circumstances where the officer submitted far from a bare-bones affidavit but a highly detailed factual affidavit that we submit provided probable cause for the search or at least, under the Court's qualified immunity jurisprudence, a reasonable officer could believe. that the warrant had probable cause.

John G. Roberts 1:32

JUSTICE BREYER- I suppose one new feature of the case is the fact that these officers submitted the affidavit to their superiors, who were attorneys.

Mr. Coates 1:44

MR. Correct. JUSTICE BREYER- Have we addressed that in a prior case? MR. I don't know that the Court — the Court has, I believe, The exclusion context, I think I have seen it. I can't recall the case, but I believe it has. And the Circuit Court certainly have talked about that as an indicia of good faith, the officer being willing to submit his work to someone else to review it. But it

Unknown 2:05

isn't good faith here. That's the problem, that we don't have a good faith test. We have a test that goes beyond good faith. Even if the officer is in good faith, according to the test we've set forth, if he's so stupid that he — executes a warrant that no reasonable officer could think was correct, he's in the pot,

Mr. Coates 2:27

right? Well, that's the test that the Court has set up, but it's a high test, plainly incompetent or knowingly violating the law. And I think what these are additional factual circumstances that show at least the officer is trying to be careful, that this isn't something that's been tossed

Elena Kagan 2:42

off.

Mr. Coates 2:42

Counsel,

Elena Kagan 2:43

I thought in the Leon case that, in fact, just like the claim in this case, that the affidavit was submitted to supervisors and the Court created the Leon test in spite of that. So to say that we have a case on point, Leon itself is on point. It created the test in the face of supervisors' review. You're not actually — are you arguing a Nuremberg defense? No, I'm just saying that — That simply because supervisors decide that it's okay, that that No. Excopates someone from responsibility?

Mr. Coates 3:20

Certainly not. And as I say, this comes up in the qualified immunity context repeatedly. And among the circuit courts, they recognized it as a factor. But it's not dispositive, not by any means. I agree with that, Your Honor.

Elena Kagan 3:30

All right. Then let's go to the other two ways that I think you're asking us to overrule our precedent. The first is using subjective information that a police officer knows but hasn't disclosed in the warrant. I'm having a little bit of difficulty understanding how an entire warrant regime that presumes that the magistrate has all pertinent information and that's why you would be let off the hook. How you can excuse a police officer when he doesn't place that information in front of the magistrate.

Mr. Coates 4:09

The way that has generally come up has not been in the validity of the warrant for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, but in terms of qualified immunity for the officer or exclusion of the evidence or non-suppression, rather, under the good faith exception.