Metrish v. Lancaster (12-547)

argument 12-547

Metrish v. Lancaster

Supreme Court of the United States 58 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 4 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central legal issue in Metrish v. Lancaster?

John G. Roberts 0:01

We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 12-547, Metrish v. Lancaster. Mr. Bursch.

Donald B. Bursch 0:08

Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. This is a Sixth Circuit habeas appeal involving EDPA deference. Harrington v. Richter holds that a Federal Court may only overturn a State Court conviction that is such an erroneous misapplication of this Court's clearly established precedent as to be beyond any possibility of fair-minded disagreement, that is, an extreme malfunction. Here, a fair-minded jurist could conclude that the Michigan Supreme Court's Carpenter decision was neither indefensible nor unexpected when it simply applied plain statutory language in accord with well-established Michigan interpretive principles. Accordingly, the Michigan Court of Appeal's application of Carpenter was not error and the Sixth Circuit should be reversed.

Donald B. Bursch 0:54

I'd like to begin with the statutory text. In 1975, the Michigan legislature passed a Comprehensive Mental Capacity Affirmative Defense Statute. In it, the defenses are defined for mental illness and mental retardation, but it says nothing about diminished capacity. And that silence is crucial here because in Michigan, for over 200 years, it has been a code jurisdiction, which means that if the statutes address a particular area of criminal law, only that statute applies, and the Michigan courts are not allowed to either add to or subtract from that statutory text. So only the Michigan legislature had the power to add a diminished capacity defense.

Unknown 1:33

200 years, you say

Donald B. Bursch 1:35

that? Yes, actually, even before Michigan was a territory, before it was a state, in 1810, it passed a law that abolished common law criminal principles when there was a statute that addressed the subject matter.

Unknown 1:47

There was some law, in effect, in Michigan on this subject from the year 1973 till the year 2001. There was no statute. And there was no ancient common law. What was — if I ask you the question, what was the law in Michigan on diminished capacity from 1973 to 2001, what would you respond?

Donald B. Bursch 2:11

It changed one time. In 1973, there was a Michigan Court of Appeals decision that recognized as a matter of common law the diminished capacity defense. But that was set aside by the 1975 statute, which established all the comprehensive diminished capacity defenses available and left out diminished capacity. So in 1975, 1976, you know, 1978 —

Unknown 2:34

How was the Michigan Court of Appeals construing the defense? Did it say — it didn't say anything about the 1975 statute —

Donald B. Bursch 2:46

Well, what the Michigan Court of Appeals did beginning in 1978 in the Mangiopani case was to ask, is diminished capacity part of the statutory code? And it never held expressly that it was. What it did in Mangiopani and in subsequent cases, it assumed that the defense existed, but it never held that. And that dicta could not override the plain language of the statute. And in fact, counsel on the other side has not pointed to a single Michigan decision where a conviction was or an exoneration, an acquittal, or even a finding of ineffective assistance was ever based on the diminished capacity defense.

Unknown 3:23

Was the 1973 case that you mentioned based on a statute, or was it based on allegedly a vacuum that the statute story structure allowed the Court to fill? I mean, is that the way the 1973 case worked? And was the 1973 case — followed by other courts, or was it just an isolated precedent?

Donald B. Bursch 3:46

The 1973 case was a common law vacuum, Justice Kennedy, where the Michigan legislature had not yet spoken about mental incapacity defenses. And so it stood alone, as the court was able to do, as a common law decision. There were no other cases that relied on it before the 75 statute was enacted. And after that point, the Michigan appellate courts did not look to the 72 decision to as the source of the doctrine, they assumed that if it existed, it must be somewhere within the statute. And then in Carpenter in 2001, the Michigan Supreme Court, when finally the very first Michigan court to look at the question explicitly says, well, it's not in the statute.