Miller v. Alabama (10-9646)

argument 10-9646

Miller v. Alabama

Supreme Court of the United States 59 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 4 days ago official recording ↗

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What constitutional precedent does the Court cite when discussing juvenile life‑without‑parole sentences?

John G. Roberts 0:01

We'll hear argument first this morning in case ten nine six four four four four four six six six six six Miller versus Alabama. Mr. Stevenson.

Unknown 0:09

Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court Uh in Graham versus Florida, this court recognized that children are inherently characterized by internal attributes and external circumstances that preclude a finding uh of a degree of culpability that would make a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole constitutionally permissible under the Court's Eighth Amendment excessiveness analysis. While the issue in Graham involved juveniles that were convicted of non homicide offenses, these deficits in maturity and judgment and decision making are not crime specific. All children are encumbered with the same barriers that this Court has found to be constitutionally relevant before imposition of a sentence.

Unknown 0:54

Of life imprisonment without parole or the death penalty. In fact, in Roper, this court acknowledged that these differences between children and adults exist even in the cases involving the most aggravated murders. These deficits, these differences are even more pronounced in young children. Mr Stevenson, but in Roper And the court also um made the point. Mm when it ruled out Uh the death penalty. It said To the extent the juvenile death penalty might have residual deterrent effect, it is worth noting That the punishment of life imprisonment without The possibility of parole. is itself a severe sanction. So the court in Roberto seem to be Uh anticipating. this case and suggesting that that it was all right, it was constitutional.

Unknown 1:54

Uh th there's no question, uh Justice Ginsberg, that the that the default sentence in in Roper was life imprisonment without parole. Uh but we actually think that specifically with regard to that provision uh there is no greater deterrent effect and these deficits that that these problems that uh children experience lend themselves to an analysis that is subject when the p punishment is life imprisonment without parole, like the death penalty. What about fifty years? Is that is that too much? What the court held in in in in Grandma. enunciated that death is different. Why is life Without parole. categorically different from sixty years or seventy years or

Unknown 2:53

Okay. As life imprisonment without parole. But there is a distinction obviously between life imprisonment without parole and any other term sentence. Those sentences in most instances if the sentence is not too extreme do permit the possibility of release. And what this court held

Unknown 3:16

uh fifty years without possibility of parole. Then you have no distinction, right? Well I think there it would be a tough case. I think imposed on a juvenile a fifty year sentence would not create the meaningful possibility of beliefs that this court uh ordered in the Graham context. It would be right on the line, but I think fifty years could actually be on the other side of a meaningful possibility of release. It would be sort of a cynical reaction if this court were to say we ban life without parole for these kinds of offenders, it would be somewhat problematic to suggest that we're going to get as close to death as possible. And then facilitate some kind of review. About fifteen years old. Fifteen, sixty years or fourteen, seventy years.

Unknown 4:03

Well, I I think from a sentencing perspective, all of those sentences would be problematic, but the distinction between a fourteen year old and a fifteen year old for constitutional purposes That of course the younger you are, the more compelling are these deficits, these these distinctions that I understand, but how are we how are we to know where to draw those lines? We can't do it on the basis of any historical tradition, certainly. Well, I think The common law left it up to the jury to take account of the of the youthfulness of the offender. They are all entitled to jury trial, right, before their uh Well that's true. But of course in this case, uh Justice Glee and in the other case that there was no discretion for the sentence, and neither the judge nor the jury could give any effect to the age of Evan Miller, who was fourteen.