Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky (16-1435)
argument 16-1435Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 1m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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What is Minnesota's statute on political apparel and why is it considered overbroad?
You'll hear argument this morning in Case 16-1435, Minnesota Voters' Alliance
v. Manske. Mr. Bremer. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, Minnesota's statute bans all conventional political expression on apparel to prevent a smaller class of material that can already be regulated under other election statutes. Shirts saying AFL-CIO, Chamber of Commerce, moveon.org, excuse me, and countless other examples are prohibited. Since a vast amount of the banned material is legitimate speech and the statute has a few plainly justified applications, it is overbroad and unconstitutional.
I was just going to ask you, those examples you gave, in your view, could be prohibited by a properly drawn statute? MoveOn.org and so forth, you say could be prohibited under a properly drawn statute? They are prohibited. They are prohibited. Could they
be prohibited under a statute that was more narrowly drawn? No, I do not think they could. Under any test, that type of generalized political expression, associations, NAACP, countless others, could not be. Do you think
more electoral— Could you clarify the procedural posture of this case? I gather the first time around, you went to the Eighth Circuit and they rejected the facial challenge, but they sent it back. on as applied. District Court said as implied is also dismissed, and it went back to the Eighth Circuit. So what — are we dealing with a facial challenge, or are we dealing with an as-applied challenge?
It's solely a facial challenge, Your Honor. The as-applied claims were not appealed, and they're not before the Court. So the only question is whether this statute on his face violates the First Amendment over breadth doctrine. And it does violate the First Amendment over breadth doctrine because it sweeps in so much political expression and association. Do
you think, Mr. Bremer, that a statute could target only electoral speech? In other words, Clinton for president, Trump for president, that sort of thing. Could a statute say that that speech cannot be worn in the polling place?
Yes, a statute does say that. In Minnesota, the first sentence of this statute
— No, I know, but could a statute constitutionally say that? If it were limited to that, would that be permissible, or is it impermissible?
Yes, Your Honor. It's a very close call, but it's not one that this Court has to make in this particular
case. I know, but I'm just asking your view.
I honestly don't know, Your Honor, whether that — that line is so close, but the statute here — The first sentence already prohibits that material, and it's unchallenged, that particular sentence here. And even assuming you could ban advocacy expression, this statute goes so far to take in so much material that isn't advocacy, that is simply self-expression of personal values and associations. So I agree it's a very tough call, but it's not one that, of course, has to decide.
But it's important for us. We're going to have to write an opinion on this. You say, well, I don't know. What about political buttons? Vote for X or
vote for Y and they're both on the ballot? Correct. As I mentioned before, the statute, the first sentence already bans that. We're
asking about a hypothetical case. Could a statute that was limited to that be upheld? And would it be constitutional in your view?
No, I don't think it would be. I don't think it would be. Because of the passive and non-distraught disruptive nature of the speech, people simply wearing that type of clothing as they go in and out of the
polling place. So you're telling us to overrule Burson?
No, Your Honor, I'm
not saying that at all. Burson basically said the opposite of what you're saying, directly and completely.
Well, as we read Burson, it didn't deal with the passive wearing of any kind of apparel campaign or more general political apparel. It dealt with active campaigning and material used in conjunction with that conduct.
That's the line you're drawing. Because someone puts something on instead of handing it around, that's the line you want us to draw?
Well, that's part of the line.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is Minnesota's statute on political apparel and why is it considered overbroad?
0:00–7:20
2
Can a law restrict only electoral speech without banning other political expression?
7:20–15:07
3
How does the Court differentiate between passive apparel and active campaign activity?
15:07–23:11
4
What legitimate state interests justify limiting speech in polling places?
23:11–31:38
5
Which types of clothing, symbols, or slogans are prohibited under Minnesota law?
31:38–38:34
6
How are as‑applied challenges to the apparel ban handled during elections?
38:34–46:18
7
How does Minnesota's apparel restriction compare to similar laws in other states?
46:18–54:37
8
What are the potential consequences of invalidating the statute for voting integrity and voter experience?
54:37–1:01:38