Monasky v. Taglieri (18-935)
argument 18-935Monasky v. Taglieri
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 0m
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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What is the Hague Convention’s purpose and how does it apply to the Monaski‑Taglieri case?
We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-935, Manaski v. Telluride. Mr. Tehrani?
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the Hay Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction is designed to protect children who have a country of habitual residence from the harmful effects of wrongful removal from that country. In this case, however, the Convention was applied to separate two-year-old A.M.T. from her mother, the only caregiver AMT had ever known, and to return the child to Italy, a country where AMT had spent only the first eight weeks of her life. The Sixth Circuit's decision upholding AMT's return to Italy rests on an erroneous definition of habitual residence. The Sixth Circuit held that AMT's parents could share an intent to raise AMT in Italy, even if they had no meeting of the minds.
The Court never explained how parents can share an intent about where a child will live if there is no actual agreement between them. Tellingly, neither Taglieri nor the United States defends the Sixth Circuit's habitual residence standard. They instead urge this Court to adopt an amorphous all-relevant circumstances inquiry. But in cases involving infants, the foreign jurisdictions on which Taglieri and the United States rely actually apply a different habitual residence standard, that standard focuses on the primary caregiver's connections to the country of removal, a far more appropriate inquiry. Ultimately, however, under any of the competing definitions of habitual residence and standards of review, the outcome of this case is the same.
Eight-week-old AMT was not habitually resident in Italy. Indeed, the District Court's unchallenged finding that Monaski intended to return to the United States with AMT as soon as possible is virtually dispositive. This Court should put an end to this already four-year-old litigation by entering an order directing AMT's return to the United States. I'd like to turn first to the definition of habitual residence. The Sixth Circuit applied a shared parental intent standard in name only because it held that AMT's parents could share an intent for her to live in Italy, even if they had no meeting of the minds or actual agreement
on that issue. This is
taken
around a year. A problem with your position, I take it your view is this child, taken to the United States at eight weeks old, has no habitual residence.
That is our position, Your Honor.
And if that's so, then there are many children who would not be covered by the Convention. The whole idea of the Convention was to stop unilateral decisions in to move a child. And you would be taking out of the Convention's coverage cases of very young children.
With respect, I disagree with the proposition that our approach would lead to a large number of children who do not have a country of habitual residence. First of all, we're talking in this case only about infants. Older children are evaluated under a different standard, and in all likelihood, based on their connections, their acclimatization to the country in which they reside, they would have a country of habitual residence. Even with respect to infants, we're dealing here with the unusual case where the breakdown of the party's relationship was simultaneous with Monaski's pregnancy and the birth of the child. In any case where the breakdown of the relationship occurs later in time, in all likelihood, there will be an agreement between
between the parents as to where the child will live for at least the foreseeable future. But from the standpoint of the objectives of the Hague Convention, there's nothing wrong with recognizing that a subset of children will have no country of habitual residence. The
problem with the standard that says if the parents have to have an agreement, in many of these cases, the relationship between the parents is so acrimonious that that the likelihood of an actual agreement is slim to none.
That would only be the case, Your Honor, if the acrimony was simultaneous with the pregnancy and birth. In other cases involving infants, the breakdown of the relationship may occur later in time, and if there was a meeting of the minds after the child's birth, that would be controlling.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Hague Convention’s purpose and how does it apply to the Monaski‑Taglieri case?
0:01–8:18
2
How does the Sixth Circuit define “habitual residence” and why is that definition contested?
8:18–15:44
3
Why do the parties argue for a primary‑caregiver‑focused test instead of an all‑relevant‑circumstances test?
15:44–23:00
4
What factual evidence shows that Monaski intended to return to the United States with AMT?
23:00–30:38
5
How do foreign courts (EU, UK, Australia) interpret habitual residence for infants?
30:38–38:30
6
What are the arguments for and against adopting a uniform “shared parental intent” standard?
38:30–45:50
7
Why might a remand be unnecessary if the district court’s findings are sufficient?
45:50–54:05
8
What relief does the Court seek—return of AMT to the U.S. and a full custody hearing?
54:05–1:00:08