Montgomery v. Louisiana (14-280)
argument 14-280Montgomery v. Louisiana
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 13m
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the central jurisdictional question the Court is being asked to decide?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case fourteen two eighty, Montgomery versus Louisiana. Mr Bernstein?
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The issue is whether to decide the question of Miller's retroactivity in this case or in a federal habeas case such as Johnson versus Manus, number fifteen dash one on this court's docket. In today's case there is no jurisdiction over that question. Because the point of section twelve fifty seven is to enforce the supremacy clause. And the supremacy clause states that when quote the laws of the United States unquote apply, quote, the judges and this is these are the key words in every State. shall be bound thereby. There is no such thing as Supreme Federal law that depends on whether a particular state voluntarily makes federal precedents binding. When a state does that,
When a state voluntarily adopts non binding federal precedents, That creates no right under federal law, which is what twelve fifty seven requires, and Michigan versus Long does not apply.
So how would you describe the adequate and independent state ground on which th this decision rested?
I would say that the lack of a binding federal law question is an antecedent requirement To borrow the terminology of the SG's brief before you get to the adequate and independent state ground analysis.
So why don't we have jurisdiction to answer that question?
certainly have jurisdiction to answer the question whether TEAG is constitutionally required. in state collateral review courts. The second part of our brief said why it is not constitutionally required in state collateral review courts, and that's basically this court's precedence from Dan Forth back to the beginning in desist and in Kaufman. have said that the Teague what have become the Teague exceptions are matters of equitable discretion and not matters of the constitution. And Uh the federal habeas statute on its face only applies in federal court. So the federal habeas court can grant relief if relief is warranted under the TEAG exception.
If a state says we acknowledge that we are holding a prisoner in contravention of federal law, but we choose to do nothing about it. Then the answer is federal habeas corpus. There is not a s second answer that the state can be required under the supremacy clause under its own procedures to enforce the federal law. And if I if I and if I were to take uh to argue that second position, I'm not quite sure what case I'd would have to support me. It wouldn't
Well I think that uh Your Honor's opinion for the court in Martinez versus Ryan, one hundred thirty two Supreme Court at thirteen nineteen to thirteen twenty suggested that there are advantages to citing the federal habeas right in the federal habeas statute rather than what the court called a freestanding constitutional claim. A major advantage here is if you say that the State Courts are bound by the T exceptions, by the constitution. Then when it goes to federal habeas, there will be very deferential EDBO review. If you say that the redress question, as the rationale of Danforth indicated in state court is a matter of state law. Then when the issue goes to federal habeas, EDBA will not apply because the state court will not have decided the federal issue.
And that is a it is a major difference. You would be actually be weakening the federal habeas statute. to recognise jurisdiction in this case. And this Court will benefit From having De novo perc percolation. in the lower federal courts, the lower habeas courts, all of which will be out the window if there's jurisdiction in this case, because the lower federal habeas courts will only be able, and the courts reviewing them on appeal, to apply the highly deferential EDPA review.
In in effect, are you s are we saying that the supremacy clause binds the states only in direct criminal proceedings. Um is that another way of phrasing your argument?
It would be that the supremacy clause only binds the states in direct proceedings and in collateral proceedings where it's an old rule.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central jurisdictional question the Court is being asked to decide?
0:01–9:23
2
How do the parties argue whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Montgomery case?
9:23–17:15
3
What is the role of the Supremacy Clause and Section 1257 in the jurisdiction analysis?
17:15–25:03
4
How does the United States contend that the Louisiana Supreme Court voluntarily adopted Teague’s framework?
25:03–35:55
5
Why is Miller v. Alabama’s retroactivity a pivotal issue in this case?
35:55–46:35
6
What distinction do the parties draw between substantive and procedural rules under Teague?
46:35–55:45
7
How do the hypothetical examples (e.g., mandatory minimums, witch trials) illustrate the procedural‑substantive debate?
55:45–1:04:48
8
What conclusions do the parties reach about the Court’s discretion and the proper remedy?
1:04:48–1:14:02