Moody v. NetChoice, LLC (22-277)

argument 22-277

Moody v. NetChoice, LLC

Supreme Court of the United States 2h 22m 8 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 7 days ago official recording ↗

▲ 0

Transcript

jump: chapters · speakers · find in transcript

Transcript

Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.

What is the argument about internet platforms' role and First Amendment rights?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We will hear argument first this morning in case twenty two two seven seven, Moody versus Net

Mr. Whitaker 0:05

Choice. Mr Whitaker? Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Internet platforms today control the way millions of Americans communicate with each other and with the world. The platforms achieved that success by marketing themselves as neutral forums for free speech. Now that they host the communications of billions of users, they sing a very different tune. They now say that they are in fact editors of their user speech, rather like a newspaper. They contend that they possess a broad First Amendment right to censor anything they host on their sites, even when doing so contradicts their own representations to consumers. But the design of the First Amendment is to prevent the suppression of speech, not to enable it.

Mr. Whitaker 0:52

That is why the telephone company and the delivery service have no First Amendment right to use their services as a choke point to silence those they disfavour. Broadly facilitating communication in that way is conduct, not speech. And if Verizon asserted a First Amendment right to cancel disfavored subscribers at a whim, That claim would fail, no less than the claimed right to censorship failed in Pruneard versus Robbins and Rumsfeld versus Fair. Social networking companies too are in the business of transmitting their users' speech. Their users are the ones who create and select the content that appears on their sites. The platform The the platforms indeed disavow responsibility for that conduct in their terms of service.

Mr. Whitaker 1:36

Platforms do sort and facilitate the presentation of user speech. But this court just last term in Twitter versus Tamina and the platforms themselves in Gonzalez versus Google described those tools as little more than passive mechanisms for organizing vast amounts of third party content. The platforms do not have a First Amendment right to apply their censorship policies in an inconsistent manner. and to censor and deplatform certain users. I welcome your questions.

Clarence Thomas 2:04

Counsel, uh it would seem that this case is a facial challenge. uh and uh to some extent it relies on the over breath doctrine but that seems to be an odd fit. since uh uh respondent represents virtually all of the platforms and that it would be easy enough for a platform who's affected to bring it as apply challenge. Uh would you comment on that?

Mr. Whitaker 2:33

But

Clarence Thomas 2:34

at least address the fact that this is a facial challenge.

Mr. Whitaker 2:38

Certainly, Your Honor, I do think that's a very significant aspect of this case. It comes to the court on a facial challenge, which means that the only question before the court is whether The statute has a plainly legitimate sweep. I actually don't understand them, Your uh Your Honor, to to be making an overbreath challenge, which as I understand it would would rely on the effects on third parties. As I understand it, they're principally relying on the fet effects on their members. If they were bringing an overbreadth challenge, they would they would have to show various third party

Clarence Thomas 3:08

statements. Well, I think how would they do that? Uh when they haven't shown that there are uh uh no there's no way that this statute can be applied that's consistent with the Constitution. Have they met that?

Mr. Whitaker 3:21

They they certainly have not, Your Honor. I mean the and and We we think the the statute has indeed a plainly legitimate sweep. And uh certainly uh there are a number of the platforms that are open to all comers and content, much like a traditional Uh uh common carrier. Just just as a traditional common carrier consistent with the First Amendment. Would be subject to uh hosting requirements, nondiscrimination requirements. Uh so too we think that the platforms that satisfy that characterization, which are a number of them, absolutely would give this statute uh a plainly legitimate statement.

Elena Kagan 3:59

Can can I uh it this is such a odd case for our usual jurisprudence. Um law is covering just about every social media platform on the internet. And we have a meek eye who are not traditional social media. um platforms.