Muldrow v. St. Louis (22-193)
argument 22-193Muldrow v. St. Louis
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 36m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the plaintiff’s claim about being transferred because of gender?
You'll hear argument this morning in case twenty two one ninety three, Muldrow versus the City of St. Louis.
Mr. Wolfman? Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Jitanya Modro maintains she was transferred from the Intelligence Division to a different job in the Fifth District because she's a woman. That is sex discrimination and it is unlawful under the plain terms of Title seven. Title seven bars an employer from discriminating against an employee. With respect to the terms, conditions or privileges of her employment. because of the employee's sex. Respondent now concedes that a lateral transfer changes the terms, conditions or privileges of employment. After all, a transferred employee cannot show up the next day and do her old job. Her job tests have changed, and that's the most basic term of employment.
So the only question left is whether transferring an employee because of sex is discrimination against that person. It is discrimination against by its ordinary meaning and under this Court's precedent means worse treatment because of a protected characteristic. With that, statutory analysis is complete. Which brings us to what seven oh three A one does not do. It doesn't require that an employer's conduct cause significant disadvantage, objective material harm, objective tangible harm or the like. And contrary to the Eighth Circuit's understanding, As this court observed in Teamsters, Title Seven provides for equal opportunity to compete for any job. whether it is thought better or worse than another. The statute prohibits discrimination, period.
If an employer transfers an employee because of a protected characteristic, That's discrimination and it's prohibited by Title Seven. The courts should reverse and allow Ms Moldrow to prove her case. I welcome the Court's questions.
Uh Counsel, you said that uh in in your opening remarks that uh worst treatment against uh a uh protect member of a protected class uh is a Title VII violation. What is the worst treatment?
The worst treatment here is the discrimination itself. So differential treatment and worst treatment are almost invariably coterminous. And here the worst treatment is the she was treated differently than a male employee in the same circumstances, and we are prepared to prove that if we are given the opportunity.
So the it doesn't matter if her salary is the same The work arrangements are the same. I know you your argument in the briefs is that uh her assignments changed, but her pay did not and her rank did not. Uh but none of that is necessary for you under in your under your argument to make a claim.
That is correct, Your Honor.
The mere transfer.
Uh We wouldn't say mere in this particular case with respect to your Honor
of the
transfer itself. it makes the claim actionable if She was treated differently than a male employee would be under the same
proposition against uh provide?
It it provides that the treatment has to be worse and there may be circumstances w which
I mean I'm you're saying two things. One you say that the mere transfer is enough. and against adds nothing. Uh or it may or it requires that the treatment be worse. But I don't beyond the mere transfer, you don't argue that you need anything else.
Th that is correct with respect to that is absolutely
So what work does against do?
The the word against is is indicating that the the operation of the conduct is against this particular employee. So that's the work that the the word against is doing. It could be it could be that it's just for emphasis, and there may be limited circumstances, as this court in indicated in Bostok, where uh You know, different treatment among men and women is not necessarily discrimination, but by and large, when a a male employee We are taking sex discrimination. uh is treated differently from a female employee in similar circumstances or would be treated differently. That's discrimination against, in this case, the female employee. You referred to both Correct. Um You referred to Bostock, uh and b Bostock says the term discriminate against
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the plaintiff’s claim about being transferred because of gender?
0:00–11:15
2
How do the parties define “discriminate against” and does it require an injury?
11:15–23:18
3
What arguments are made about a de minimis or trivial injury standard?
23:18–34:55
4
How is a “transfer” defined for purposes of Title VII’s terms‑and‑conditions analysis?
34:55–48:05
5
Do bathroom, dress‑code, and grooming distinctions count as unlawful discrimination?
48:05–1:01:56
6
What is each side’s overall position on whether the transfer claim is actionable?
1:01:56–1:16:23
7
How do the Justices’ questions shape the Court’s potential ruling on injury and harm?
1:16:23–1:28:07
8
What are the final arguments and the Court’s decision on the case?
1:28:07–1:36:41