Murphy v. Smith (16-1067)

argument 16-1067

Murphy v. Smith

Supreme Court of the United States 53 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 4 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central dispute over the statutory phrase “to satisfy” in Murphy v. Smith?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument first this morning in case sixteen ten sixty seven, Murphy versus Smith. Mr Banner.

Matthew D. Banner 0:10

Mr Chief Justice, it may it please the Court. When a prisoner wins a civil rights case, And he's awarded damages, and he's awarded attorneys' fees. The prisoner himself has to pay part of the fees out of the damages judgment. The statute at issue in this case specifies the size of the prisoner's share. This is what the statute says. A portion of the judgment not to exceed 25 percent should be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees. In the 20 plus years since the statute was enacted, virtually all the district courts have interpreted it literally. They identify an appropriate portion of the judgment not exceeding twenty five percent. And they deduct that amount from the attorney fee award payable by the defendant.

Matthew D. Banner 0:54

In our case, the Seventh Circuit read the statute differently. to mean that attorneys' fees must be taken out of the damages first up to twenty five percent of the damages, so that the defendant is only liable for any fees left over. But the statute does not say that. All it says is that the portion of the judgment is that a portion of the judgment no greater than twenty five percent must be allocated to fees. Respondents mistakenly suggest that Congress's use of the words satisfy indicates that the plaintiff has to pay the largest possible share of the fees in all cases. But that can't be right because the statute itself says what share the plaintiff has to pay, a portion of the judgment not exceeding twenty five percent.

Matthew D. Banner 1:40

The rest of the attorney's fee award in excess of the plaintiff's share is payable by the defendant up to the statutory cap of one hundred and fifty percent of the damages. There's nothing in the statute.

Elena Kagan 1:51

Uh adversary points to a number of statutes. that use the verb to satisfy or I guess not the verb but the proposition to satisfy. to refer to the complete fulfilment of an obligation. How do you distinguish those examples?

Matthew D. Banner 2:10

The word satisfy often means the complete fulfillment of an obligation, but in this statute it can't mean that, because the statute makes clear that the plaintiff doesn't have to completely fulfill the obligation to pay attorneys' fees. The statute says exactly how much. Well, it is

Unknown 2:26

sensible to have a cap. It is just a cap.

Matthew D. Banner 2:29

Well, exactly. It's a cap. It's a 25 percent cap. That's right. It's it's uh the statute says that the plaintiff's share of the attorney's fees uh is uh twenty-five percent or less of the judgment.

John G. Roberts 2:41

Well, but but you start with the notion of satisfaction. In other words, satisfying a debt. I mean, if you owe somebody $100 and you give them fifty, that person isn't going to say, well, you have satisfied your obligation.

Matthew D. Banner 2:51

No, that's right. And so the the the word satisfy standing alone sometimes often does mean uh uh uh complete payment, but that would make nonsense of the text of this statute. The text of this statute makes clear that the plaintiff doesn't have to pay the attorney's. No, no, I understand

John G. Roberts 3:07

the point, but it I am just suggesting that that's not uh Certainly a t total uh uh response. Yes, you have to satisfy it, but as Justice Kennedy just suggested, there is also a cap. And if the reason you can't satisfy it is because of the cap, well that's just the way the statute has balanced the two obligations. But the initial obligation is to satisfy uh uh

Matthew D. Banner 3:30

Well you know uh There was a provision like that in some of the precursor bills, right? But this that sentence was omitted from the final legislation. As this there there was a sentence that said exactly the interpretation that that that you've just been uh uh giving that the uh that the defendant is liable only for fees in excess of twenty-five percent of the judgment. But as the statute was working its way through Congress, Congress rejected uh uh that provision. Congress kept the provision that appears in the statute uh uh that appears in the statute which says that the plaintiff's share is twenty five percent or less of the judgment.

Unknown 4:12

Wha why why would the Congress have required