NRC v. Texas (23-1300)
argument 23-1300NRC v. Texas
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 35m
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 1 month ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the purpose of the oral argument in NRC v. Texas?
We will hear argument this morning in Case 231300, Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Texas and the Consolidated Case. Mr. Stewart. Thank you,
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. First, the petitions for review should be dismissed because neither Texas nor Faskin was a party to the NRC licensing proceedings. Texas did not try to intervene in the agency adjudication. Faskin moved to intervene, but its request was denied and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial. And there is no sound basis for the Fifth Circuit's ultra-virus exception to the Hobbs Act's party-aggrieved requirement. If the court reaches the merits, it should reverse the Court of Appeals judgment. The Atomic Energy Act prohibits the unlicensed possession of spent nuclear fuels constituent parts while authorizing the commission to license private interim storage of those substances.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act left that scheme intact. And since 1980, the NRC's regulations have provided for both on-site and off-site storage. That system allows a substantial role for private market responses to the country's nuclear waste storage issues, subject to Commission oversight to ensure that storage is safe and consistent with statutory requirements. I welcome the Court's questions.
Mr. Stewart, what does it take to be a party in these proceedings?
In an adjudication, you would need to intervene, and the Commission's rule set out the process for intervention.
So when can a party—when can— an interested person
intervenes. The Commission's rules set out two requirements. One is basically a standing requirement, and that is essentially that you be an interested person, that your interests be affected by the outcome. And second, the Commission's rules require what's called an admissible contention. And the rules were changed in 1990. The changes were upheld by the D.C. Circuit. And basically the problem the Commission had confronted was that it would get requests to intervene accompanied by very vague assertions.
But so... Aside from the substance, when can you intervene? When can an interested person intervene?
Essentially, the commission will issue notice that a licensing proceeding is underway or will soon be underway, and then it will give a certain amount of time for- How much time?
How does the NRC define who may intervene in its licensing proceedings?
I think it was 60 or 90 days to- give notice of your intent to intervene, and then there were written submissions. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board passed in the first instance on various requests to intervene, and then there was an appeal available to the full commission, and then FASCN sought judicial review of the commission's denial of its request to intervene.
The regulation that you cited, how is that supported by the statutory language?
The D.C. Circuit in the case Union of Concerned Scientists that I referred to a moment ago, I think it's a 920F2nd, said that this was an aspect of agencies' traditional broad authority to regulate their own procedures.
It seems to go beyond the statutory language itself. Is that correct? Do you agree with
that? I agree that the statutory language in itself would not impose this requirement. And the Commission's prior rules had not done so. In
looking at the statutory language, Mr. Stewart, it says that any person who requests a hearing and their interests are affected shall be admitted. That's a mandatory obligation, as I read it. And FASC and their interest is affected and they requested a hearing. Those things are undisputed, right? Yes. So help
me with Justice Kagan's question. I guess the two things I would say were, first, when Faskin appealed to the D.C. Circuit from the denial of its request to intervene, it didn't make the argument that the commission's rules were invalid or it had a statutory right to intervene.
It said it had a statutory right to intervene, and I read the D.C. Circuit opinion. It didn't address
that argument at all. It is said that it has a right to intervene, but it was asserting that right under the Commission's own rules. And I guess the second thing I would say is, at most, the argument you're suggesting would imply that Faskin ought to have been allowed to intervene.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the purpose of the oral argument in NRC v. Texas?
0:00–2:24
2
How does the NRC define who may intervene in its licensing proceedings?
2:24–10:06
3
What statutory provisions does the NRC rely on to justify private off‑site storage of spent nuclear fuel?
10:06–27:49
4
Why does the government argue that Texas and Faskin were not parties to the NRC proceeding?
27:49–41:57
5
How does the Hobbs Act’s “party‑aggrieved” requirement affect the case?
41:57–57:02
6
What is the significance of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act’s Section 101‑55H for off‑site storage?
57:02–1:08:33
7
How do security concerns and market‑based solutions influence the Court’s analysis?
1:08:33–1:19:31
8
What are the parties’ final arguments and the Court’s next steps?
1:19:31–1:35:49