Ocasio v. United States (14-361)
argument 14-361Ocasio v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
57 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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What does the Hobbs Act require for a Hobbs Act extortion charge?
We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 14361, Ocasio v. United States. Mr. Davis.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the Hobbs Act requires that a defendant obtain property from another. In this case, Mr. Ocasio was charged with conspiring with the owners of a repair shop not to obtain property from another, but from the owners themselves. The plain language of the Hobbs Act resolves this case. When two people agree that one will pay the other a bribe, They have merely agreed to exchange property between themselves, not to obtain property from another. The historical background, the statutory structure, and basic principles of criminal law all point in the same direction. There are no Old English or state cases involving conspiracies to extort property from a co-conspirator.
Does that mean that you would have to, in order to get at this venture, you would have to bring two separate prosecutions one against your client for the extortion, and then a separate crime — a separate prosecution in State Court against the body shop owners? MR.
Yes, Justice Ginsburg, I think that is correct. Maryland has a bribery statute that might apply in a situation And Congress has passed a bribery statute targeted to bribery of state and local officials, 18 U.S.C. 666, that may or may not apply to the repair shop owners. But we don't think they could be convicted of
it. Is it well established or even not well established that you are obtaining property under color of law when you give somebody a bribe? Your Honor. It seems to me, what that means to me under color of law is you pretend to have a legal right to it, which in fact you don't have.
Justice Scalia, until 1992, I think that was an open question, but this Court decided in Evans v. United States in 1992 that Hobbs Act extortion encompasses the paying of bribes.
I dissented, I assume.
But, Your Honor, I think that the decision in Evans was really the high-water mark of this Court's Hobbs Act jurisprudence. And since then, the Court has been careful not to expand the Hobbs Act.
We have stated that a person may be liable for conspiracy even though he was incapable of committing the substantive offense. Does that carry the day for the government's argument here, or is that distinguishable, that principle? No.
I think that's distinguishable in principle, Justice Kennedy. JUSTICE KENNEDY.
And why? MR.
Well, certainly not every conspirator must personally commit every element of the substantive offense.
JUSTICE KENNEDY. But he must not even be capable of it. Must not even be capable of
it,
as I understand what we've said.
MR. That's correct, Your Honor. Must not even be capable of committing every element of the substantive offense. But each conspirator must specifically intend that someone commit every element of the substantive offense. JUSTICE KENNEDY.
And why isn't that test satisfied here? Because the shop owners agreed that Mr. Ocasio would commit every element of the substantive offense.
MR. The shop owners, Your Honor, agreed that Mr. Ocasio would obtain property from another, not from themselves. So I think that —
MR. Well, Mr. Ocasio is committing every element of the substantive offense. He is obtaining property from another. That is, he is obtaining property from the body shop owners. and the body shop owners agreed that he would do so. So it seems to me that in the normal way that conspiracy law works, there is a conspiracy here.
MR. Justice Kagan, I don't think that's quite right. I think that there must be a unity of purpose in conspiracy law. And Mr. Ocasio may have agreed to obtain property from another, but the body shop owners agreed to obtain property from themselves. So there's no unity of purpose. JUSTICE
SOTOMAYOR They only need to agree that he should obtain property from another, and that is exactly what they agreed to.
Justice Kagan, I think the best way to approach your question is through imagining how this would happen in ordinary English. The government has a John and Susan, has its response to our John and Susan hypothetical in its brief.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What does the Hobbs Act require for a Hobbs Act extortion charge?
0:00–7:11
2
How do the parties argue whether the repair‑shop owners are “another” under the statute?
7:11–14:48
3
Why is the “unity of purpose” test important for conspiracy liability?
14:48–21:07
4
What is the “active participation” doctrine and how does it affect the case?
21:07–29:04
5
How do the Justices compare the Hobbs Act to the Mann Act and other statutes?
29:04–35:31
6
Why does the government claim the conspiracy charge adds only $600 in restitution?
35:31–43:01
7
What role does the entity “Majestic” play in the alleged bribery scheme?
43:01–50:31
8
Is the petitioner's challenge a sufficiency of the evidence issue or a statutory‑interpretation issue?
50:31–57:20