Ohio v. EPA (23A349)
argument 23A349Ohio v. EPA
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 29m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the central dispute in Ohio v. EPA and how does the Good Neighbor provision apply?
We will hear argument first this morning in case twenty three A three hundred and forty nine, Ohio versus the Environmental Protection Agency and the consolidated cases. Mr. Thurman?
Mr Chief Justice, may it please the court. The EPA set out to address the contributions of twenty three upwind states to downwind air pollution through a single federal plan. But as commenters predicted and before the plan became final, The legal predicates for the federal plan, that is, the state plan disapprovals. came under fire in courts all around the country. The spectre of lesser participation in the federal plan revealed yet another problem. The EPA's choice of method, that is selecting a single cost threshold and applying it uniformly across all twenty three states to establish emissions limits, has consequences. Namely The math doesn't work when the inputs don't match the outputs. With the SIP disapprovals in flux and the EPA's methodology requiring full participation,
The EPA had an obligation to consider What happens to the federal plan when one or more states drop out? That is when the inputs twenty three states don't match the outputs, now the eleven states that remain in the plan. Its failure has become consequential. The plan now regulates under half of the states and a quarter of the emissions that the EPA originally set out to regulate. Under this fractured plan. And without a stay. The remaining states and their industries face serious harm. I welcome the court's questions.
Well it seems that uh your argument is dependent on whether or not the original plan was interdependent and required all the states to be in. Uh what's your best evidence for that?
Best evidence for that, Your Honor, is the method that the EPA chose. And the method it chose has to do with discerning points of diminishing marginal returns. Which means that when the mix of states changes, in this case when states drop out and their particular technologies and industries drop out with them. Those points of diminishing marginal returns shift, and they shift somewhat unpredictably, which means that the relevant cost threshold for a different mix of states could be cheaper, and with full candor to the court, it could be the same or even be more expensive. The problem is we don't know. It is the unpredictability that renders this plan unreasonable as to any different mix of states.
Could you break that down? I don't understand. You started your introduction by saying that the commonality was cost. But I thought that costs had to do with the technology. and how much it costs to implement. So I don't see why that would be different among the fifty states or marginally important enough to be different. And to the extent that the other states dropping out don't increase the cost for any of the remaining states. their their allotment remains the same regardless of how many people are participating. So I don't see how You're raising an argument Um Frankly, not for yourself, because nothing's changed.
Well Your Honor, let me take that in reverse and I'm happy to go down the gritty path of the technical details. But before that, the allotments may not change in the way the EPA has executed the plan, but the allotments themselves are wrong. when the EPA fails to consider what happens with lesser participation.
But show me.
Sure, Your Honor. And the answer goes again to the methodology, which I keep calling the point of diminishing marginal returns question. And I'm happy to go step by step into what is admittedly an extremely gritty mathematical problem.
Why don't you get to the end question? Nothing is changing in your cost. or what you have to do. Meaning the states that are inva who for whom stay stays have not been given. Their allotment doesn't change. Nothing changes.
Again, Your Honor, uh You're talking about the execution of those allocations, but the allocations themselves are now wrong. And what I mean by that is the EPA's method of selecting a single cost threshold. Now that goes to looking for points on a graph where an additional dollar spent produces little to no additional emissions reductions.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central dispute in Ohio v. EPA and how does the Good Neighbor provision apply?
0:00–10:30
2
How does EPA’s single‑cost‑threshold methodology create problems when states drop out of the federal plan?
10:30–21:28
3
Why is the interdependence of the 23‑state plan critical to the cost‑effectiveness analysis?
21:28–31:41
4
What arguments are being made about the adequacy of EPA’s severability provision?
31:41–42:53
5
How do the parties define and prove irreparable harm for an emergency stay?
42:53–55:05
6
What role does the trading program play and why might it remain functional with fewer states?
55:05–1:06:55
7
When is a stay considered certworthy and how does the Supreme Court evaluate that standard?
1:06:55–1:18:30
8
What are the broader implications for downwind states if the EPA’s plan is upheld or struck down?
1:18:30–1:29:05