Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (19-267)
argument 19-267Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 38m
9 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 8 days ago
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What is the central legal issue being argued in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey‑Berru?
We'll hear argument next in case number 19267, Our Lady of Guadalupe School versus Agnes Morrissey Beirut and the Consolidated Case. Mr. Rasback?
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, if separation of church and state means anything at all, it must mean that government cannot interfere with the church's decisions about who is authorized to teach its religion. In this country, is emphatically not the province of judges, juries, or government officials to decide who ought to teach Catholic fifth graders that Jesus is the Son of God, or who ought to teach Jewish preschoolers what it means to say, Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God, the Lord is one. And at bottom, that is what these cases are about. Who controls who teaches the faith to schoolchildren? Under Hosanna Tabor, the answer is easy. Churches must choose those who, quote, teach their faith.
Indeed, that is one of the most important religious functions for any religious community, passing the faith on to the next generation. And since the teachers here were the church's primary agents for teaching the Catholic faith to fifth graders, teaching them for hours a week, much more than parish priests, they fall within the ministerial exception immunity. Respondents would have the court ignore all that, substituting a formalistic standard that relies first and foremost on the employee's title to determine whether the ministerial exception applies. That would wrongly elevate form over function and force judges to decide what titles sound religious enough to qualify. And it would hopelessly entangle church and state.
Unsurprisingly, no court has ever adopted respondent's title test. If respondent's arguments give some members of the court deja vu all over again, that is because respondents have recycled many of the arguments the court unanimously rejected eight years ago in Hosanna Tabor. The pretext inquiry, the notice requirement, the idea that freedom of association makes freedom of religion entirely unnecessary, all were raised in Hosanna Tabor and rejected unanimously. Eight years later, respondents' arguments are not any more convincing. In short, there is no reason for government to get in the business of teaching religion. The Ninth Circuit should be reversed.
Counsel, you say in your brief that personnel is policy and that teachers, as part of their job, personify policy. church values. Is that enough to trigger the exception in your case?
I think in this case, I don't think that's something you have to address, and I don't think that it would personification...
Well, I don't have to address it, but you do, because I asked.
Yes, Your Honor. I think on the basis of personification alone, I don't think that that would necessarily... mean that we would win the case. I think that the right answer is that what functions were they performing, and those functions were to teach the faith for hours on end over the course of a week.
Does your argument, both with respect to personifying values as a factor and with the other functions that the teachers might perform, apply in the case of teachers who are not Catholic, because many Catholic schools hire teachers who
aren't? So I don't think it does. Hosanna Tabor rejected the idea that there was a problem with non-Lutherans teaching Lutheran doctrine to Lutheran kids at a Lutheran school, and ultimately religious bodies get to decide who best performs those important religious functions, and courts really shouldn't be in the business of second-guessing that. I would point the court to some of the briefs, for example, the Stephen Wise Temple Brief, which talks about how difficult it would be for Jewish entities if they could not hire non-co-religionists.
Justice Thomas?
Yes, counsel. How exactly would you go about, or a secular court go about, determining whether an employee's duties and functions are religious or whether they're important?
Well, I think the best way to think about it is with respect to the religious part of it, I think you can look at the list of things that this court talked about in Hosanna Tabor, so teaching, preaching, as well as the list that was in the
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central legal issue being argued in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey‑Berru?
0:00–11:52
2
How do the parties define and apply the “ministerial exception” to religious school teachers?
11:52–22:04
3
Why does the debate focus on titles versus actual religious functions of employees?
22:04–34:16
4
What hypothetical scenarios do the justices use to test the scope of the exception?
34:16–46:47
5
How have lower courts historically interpreted the ministerial exception before Hosanna‑Tabor?
46:47–58:29
6
What are the potential consequences for lay teachers and other staff if the exception is expanded?
58:29–1:10:09
7
How do the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clause concerns shape the argument?
1:10:09–1:21:36
8
What conclusion does counsel urge the Court to reach regarding categorical immunity?
1:21:36–1:38:32