Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter (12-135)

argument 12-135

Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter

Supreme Court of the United States 59 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 5 days ago official recording ↗
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What precedent does the Court cite for requiring a contractual basis to compel arbitration?

John G. Roberts 0:02
We'll hear argument first this morning in case twelve one hundred thirty five, Oxford Health Plans versus Florida. Mr. Waxman?
Paul D. Clement 0:09
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. In Stolt Nielsen this court held first that a party may not be compelled to submit to arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so. And second That because class arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed that parties consented to class arbitration simply by agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator. That precisely describes this case. The agreement commits the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration and says nothing about class arbitration. There is no extrinsic evidence suggesting that the parties ever considered such a prospect. And there is no background principle of state law that favors it.
Unknown 1:04
About the parties never considering it. Um when this case was in the New Jersey courts, Oxford explained this is in the red brief at page twenty seven, but it's quoting Oxford's counsel then, that the arbitrator has the power to ascertain whether the parties contemplated class arbitration In there. Agreement. A power. in the arbitrator that Oxford does not contest. So that that seems to be a recognition by Oxford that that uh class arbitration was Uh time to say this.
Paul D. Clement 1:48
Well, Justice Ginsburg, two things. First of all, If you look at page ten or page fourteen, footnote seven of our yellow brief, you'll see all of the references made in the advocacy before the state court judge by my f my brother here. ac not recognizing repeatedly that what Oxford was asking for was a dismissal and a transfer to individual arbitration, bilateral arbitration. There was no mistake whatsoever In the New Jersey state Hoxman position was Yes, that bilateral arbitration was what was requested and th but there was similarly No dispute. that both parties, certainly Oxford, took the position based on an understanding of New Jersey law at the time, because s n this court hadn't decided class action questions, that
Paul D. Clement 2:50
The decision would be submitted in the first instance to the arbitrator as it was in Stolt Nielsen. Yes, Justice Soda. That's my
Elena Kagan 2:57
question. Did you never you never argue that it was beyond the power of the arbitrator to decide this question, did you?
Paul D. Clement 3:07
In the first instance, no.
Elena Kagan 3:09
And do you take the position that this is a always an arbitrator's question when all dismutes are supposed to s be submitted, or was just was there just a mistake here?
Paul D. Clement 3:19
Well I think it was a mistake here. I think it was it was understandable in light of the state of the law in two thousand and two.
Elena Kagan 3:27
So why should we rewrite our standard of review to accommodate your client's error? Because that's really what you are asking us to do. More than once we have said an error of law or fact. is not a basis to say that an arbitrator exceeded his or her powers. Oh
Paul D. Clement 3:46
Justice Sodemeyer, we are not asking the court to vary in any material respect the highly deferential standard that's reflected in Section ten A four of the Federal Arbitration Act. But we are asking that that generally applicable standard of review be applied to a question with a very strong empirical presumption that the FAA has attached to it and this court has announced, which is that absent an actual agreement by the contracting parties that they will permit their disputes to be arbitrated on a class basis. an inference that may not, as a matter of federal law, be derived from an agreement to submit all disputes to arbitrary.
Unknown 4:34
So your rule is that although we must defer to an arbitrator's interpretation of the contract. In this case there is an exception because
Paul D. Clement 4:48
Well in this case You defer. as you always do, but You you you you You have to provide there is some level of review. It's not just because the arbitrator says, I've looked at the contract and I think this. As this court has said over and over again, including in Solt, just saying something is so doesn't make it so. There is deferential review, but there is review, and the review is of a proposition that this court has now said twice.

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