Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid (10-507)
argument 10-507Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 1m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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What is the core legal question about the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act in this case?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case ten five oh seven, Pacific operators offshore versus Villa Dolid. Mr. Clement?
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the straightforward question in this case is whether the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act provides a remedy for a worker injured in a forklift mishap on dry land. The answer is no. A worker injured on dry land, from operations on dry land, has a remedy in the State Workers' Compensation Law, but not from Oxla's extension of the Longshore Act to the Outer Continental Shelf. Indeed, both the Benefits Review Board and the Ninth Circuit here held that the accident occurred too far inland for direct coverage under the Long Shore Act.
When you say on land, do you wh where do you put the three mile state uh uh m offshore limit. Does that count as land in under your view?
N no, it wouldn't count as land, uh, Mr. Chief Justice, if there were platforms on there that were themselves treated as land. That might be I think the most of the three miles from shore is going to be the navigable waters. And that might be covered, for example, directly under the Longshore Act. But as I say, one of the anomalies here is there was a direct Long Shore Act claim in this case. And the determination was that the facility here was too far inland for direct coverage under the Long Shore Act. So therefore, the counterintuitive proposition on the other side of the table today is that in extending the Longshore Act to the outer continental shelf, Congress effectively created a boomerang effect.
that caused the Longshore Act to apply further inland than it otherwise would. Mr
Clement, just to follow up on the Chief Justice's question, if there's a helicopter crash in the water. Let's say it occurs two point five miles from the shore. Uh is that covered? And similarly, would it be covered if it occurred 3.5 miles from the shore?
Well, Justice Kagan, I think the best answer is both of those crashes would be covered directly by the Long Shore Act. Because the Long Shore Act, by its own terms, not extended by Oxla, covers the navigable waters. And both of those would be accidents occurring in the navigable waters. And in the part of this Court's opinion in the Pacific Operators case, addressing the DOSA claim, this court said that a helicopter effectively, when it's performing this kind of ferrying function, is a vessel. So I would think that the right answer there is not that Oxla extends the Long Shore Act, but the Long Shore Act applies directly under those circumstances.
The curious thing about this case is that the statutory language seems to me to speak quite clearly to some theory of causation, any injury occurring as the result of operations conducted on the outer continental shelf. That's that's causation. Maybe it's but four, maybe it's proximate, but it's some some species of causation, and yet nobody wants this really to be, neither you nor the your adversary nor the government wants this to be. Everyone wants to smuggle something else into into here into this.
Well, Justice Alito, let me talk first about the causation and then about the smuggling if I can. As to the causation, I think there is both causation in this 1333 B and a CITUS requirement that both sides acknowledge. At a bare minimum, there have to be injuries resulting from operations conducted on the shelf. And I think that alone, that causation principle alone, if faithfully applied, is enough to decide this case in our favor. But let me address the smuggling, because I do think give me
an example of a of an injury that occurs uh on the shelf that is not a consequence of operations conducted what just beachcombers out there or what?
Well I I think the best example would be, Your Honor, is somebody who is on the shelf but they're not employed in the relevant production purposes. And so you might have an account what what what are they doing out there? Well you might have an accountant out there. You might just have some employees who are out there whale watching or something.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the core legal question about the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act in this case?
0:03–8:27
2
How do the parties argue whether a forklift accident on dry land is covered by the Longshore Act?
8:27–15:41
3
What role does causation play in determining coverage under OXLA versus state workers’ compensation?
15:41–23:47
4
How do the statutes define “United States” and “operations on the shelf” for jurisdictional purposes?
23:47–32:02
5
Why is there a debate between a status‑based test and a citus (site‑of‑injury) requirement?
32:02–38:17
6
How does the Jones Act compare to OXLA when a worker is injured on a floating platform or in a helicopter crash?
38:17–45:40
7
What practical examples illustrate when a worker is or isn’t covered by OXLA (e.g., land travel, platform repairs, offshore helicopter rides)?
45:40–53:55
8
How do overlapping federal and state benefits work, and what does the Court say about offsetting payments?
53:55–1:01:25