Paroline v. United States (12-8561)
argument 12-8561Paroline v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
59 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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What statutory issue does Paroline v. United States focus on?
We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 12-8561, Paraline v. United States. Mr. Schneider.
May it please — Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court. This is a case about statutory construction. Specifically, under 18 U.S.C. 2259, must a victim's losses be approximately caused by a defendant's offense conduct before a sentencing judge can award restitution. The short answer to the question is all losses must be approximately caused. Eleven courts of appeals and the government agree. The Fifth Circuit ignored the plain text of the statute and the enumerated enforcement provisions of 3664 to craft a restitution scheme where the possession of two images of child pornography resulted in the award of $3.4 million to Doyle-Paroline, which was jointly and severally liable. In my time before the Court, I wish to address, first, why the Fifth Circuit decision is incorrect, and second, why the government's concept of aggregate causation conflicts with its statutory burden of proof contained in 3664E.
Well, before you do that, could you explain why there is — an issue of proximate causation here? Why isn't there clearly proximate cause? Why is it — why does it matter? MR.
Well, I think there has to be — in all restitution cases, the issue is whether or not the person's conduct caused the harm and losses. And harm and losses are two different things.
MR. Yes. Well, why isn't the issue here a question of factual causation? What loss is proximately caused by the possession
of child pornography? That's a fact-intensive question, and that's what the district court has to determine. Whether on the facts presented, there are identifiable losses that were caused by the defendant's conduct, and there can be.
It seems you're confusing proximate cause with cause and fact. They are two legal requirements, but not the same. Proximate cause is foreseeability. There is no argument, I think, that anyone who possesses child pornography knows that the individual depicted is going to feel invaded by that viewing. So there's no issue that the person is hurt. The question is a different one. which is the cause and fact. I think that's what my colleague Sam Alito was talking about. So why do you continue to talk about proximate cause when it's a different concept at said issue? Well — Is her treatment — I think you're arguing that her treatment has to be a but for this possession.
I think they go hand in hand, because when dealing with proximate cause, would the conduct — is the losses the natural sequence from the conduct — And the result. And what we're dealing with is would the losses have occurred but for the conduct. And this situation, in this case where the damage model was created six months before the notice is received, then you don't have the relationship between the loss and the conduct or the notice of the conduct. And it's a real problem. But the important consideration in interpretation of the statute is the government's burden of proof under 3664E. Would you agree
that the losses here were the proximate result, at least, of the aggregate actions of all the offenders? Would you go that far?
Justice Kennedy, the problem with aggregate causation does not
apply — Of the aggregate actions of all the offenders. It would be a harm, but
not a
— Pardon me,
an
approximate
harm. All right. But the problem is when you're dealing with aggregate causation, that conflicts with the statutory burden of proof that the government has under 3664E, which is made applicable to the — 2059 under Section B-2. And you'll find 3664E at Appendix 22 to our merits brief.
Why should we get to that question when we have what seems to be a clear order from Congress, and it is in 2259A. It says, the Court shall order restitution for Any offense under this chapter sounds like that's a direction that if there's an offense under this chapter, which is undisputed there is, the Court shall order restitution.
Only if the losses are the result of the offense, because the government's burden of proof is that they must demonstrate by preponderance of the evidence that
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What statutory issue does Paroline v. United States focus on?
0:01–8:49
2
How do the parties argue about proximate versus factual causation?
8:49–15:30
3
Why does the Fifth Circuit’s restitution scheme conflict with the statute’s text?
15:30–24:53
4
What are the government’s arguments for aggregate causation and joint‑and‑several liability?
24:53–32:28
5
How does the Court interpret the “full amount of the victim’s losses” requirement?
32:28–38:22
6
What formulas and apportionment methods are proposed for calculating restitution?
38:22–45:37
7
How do the justices address the practical challenges of assigning liability to thousands of offenders?
45:37–52:06
8
What is the final request to the Supreme Court regarding the Fifth Circuit’s decision?
52:06–59:53