Patchak v. Zinke (16-498)
argument 16-498Patchak v. Zinke
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 2m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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What constitutional argument does the petitioner make against Section 2B of the Gunn‑Lake Act?
We'll hear argument this morning in case 16498, Patrick v. Zinke. Mr. Gant. Mr. Chief Justice, it may please the Court. Section 2B of the Gunn-Lake Act is unconstitutional because it is incompatible with several well-established strands of this Court's separation of powers jurisprudence, as well as with Article 3 itself. With Section 2B, Congress directed the Federal Courts to dismiss a pending case otherwise properly before the Courts. As a consequence of that directive to dismiss a pending case, With respect to Mr. Patrick's case, the courts were prevented from performing their constitutionally assigned responsibilities to decide cases before them and to say what the law is in the context of deciding those cases.
Section 2B is precisely the kind of legislative review of judicial decisions that the framers rejected when they designed the Constitution. Mr.
Gant, when you say directed that a case shall be dismissed, are you referring only to the last few words of this statute, or are you referring more broadly?
I'm referring to the words that refer to dismissal itself. Right, and shall be promptly dismissed. Yes. Are
you suggesting that if those — Five words were not in the statute that the case would come out differently?
I am not suggesting that. I think it would still have come out differently. For example, if you dropped the reference to dismissal but left maintained, the result would be the same. The same would be true if there had been a removal of judicial review.
In other words, if the statute had contained just 2A but not 2B, same result?
No. I understand that to be a different question from Justice Kagan's. If 2A were the only part of the statute, we had no 2B, 2C is not an issue here. So if we had 2A only, we wouldn't be here arguing that there was a separation of powers violation. Part of the problem here
— But if you had 2B that finished, just shall not be filed or maintained in a federal court, full stop, you're saying that would be the same statute as the one we actually have?
It would still be unconstitutional. Yeah. Now, the omission — of the shall be dismissed language is not without significance. And if I may, I'd like to explain. The direction to dismiss is a quintessential judicial function. It's not surprising that Black's Dictionary in defining dismissal refers to it as especially a judge's decision to stop a case.
What do you do with the McArdle
case? McArdle was... The fact that a statute strips jurisdiction from a court doesn't mean that it's immunized from review under separation of powers. So the touchstone has to be, and the relevant strands of the separation of powers jurisprudence at issue here are really two parts. One is, has Congress exercised the judicial power and or has Congress prevented the courts from fulfilling its constitutionally assigned responsibilities? I submit that both have occurred here as a result of what is in the actual to-be, but the same result would arise if you omitted just the words shall be dismissed. MR. If this
is just a jurisdiction-stripping statute, could you just say as succinctly as possible what the rule is that you would like us to adopt? What is the separation of powers rule that you would like us to adopt with respect to a purely jurisdiction-stripping statute?
MR. I want to be directly responsive to your question, but I also want to say, and I've made this observation in the briefs, I think the better view is that it is not jurisdictional. I'm happy to elaborate on that later. But if we assume that it's a jurisdiction-stripping statute —
Well, on that, suppose, following up on the initial questions, if all that to be said was that an action relating to this land shall not be maintained in a federal court, would you say that is not a jurisdiction-stripping statute?
That certainly looks more like a jurisdiction-stripping statute. The reason I say that the better view is it's not jurisdictional is at least twofold. One is, and I've been accused by some colleagues of taking ARBA too seriously, but this Court went out of its way in ARBA to announce to the world, and to Congress in particular, that it wanted a new rule, that if a Court wanted a statute to be viewed as jurisdictional, it needed to clearly say so.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What constitutional argument does the petitioner make against Section 2B of the Gunn‑Lake Act?
0:00–8:35
2
How does the Court distinguish a jurisdiction‑stripping statute from a regular legislative amendment?
8:35–17:56
3
Why does the petitioner argue that the “shall be dismissed” language makes the statute unconstitutional?
17:56–24:55
4
What separation‑of‑powers test does the Court apply to determine if Congress is exercising judicial power?
24:55–32:50
5
How do the parties define the rule the Court should adopt for purely jurisdiction‑stripping statutes?
32:50–40:22
6
What role does sovereign immunity play in the parties’ arguments about the Gunn‑Lake Act?
40:22–48:51
7
How do the justices use hypothetical cases (e.g., Smith v. Jones, prayer‑in‑school) to illustrate the limits on congressional power?
48:51–55:36
8
What is the final takeaway on whether Congress can direct the outcome of a pending case without changing the underlying law?
55:36–1:02:53