Patel v. Garland, Att'y Gen. (20-979)

argument 20-979

Patel v. Garland, Att'y Gen.

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 31m 8 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 6 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the core statutory question about “judgment regarding the granting of relief” in Patel v. Garland?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 2979, Patel v.

Christopher J. Fleming 0:04

Garland. Mr. Fleming. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, as the government agrees, Section 1252A2B1 does not bar review of the agency's threshold determination that Mr. Patel is ineligible for adjustment of status. That understanding is consistent with the statutory text, context, and history, and it's also consistent with this Court's explanation in Kukana that Congress could have written B-1 differently. It could have barred review of any individual determination, as it did in subsection A-1, or of the final order of removal, as it did in subsection C. But Congress didn't use those words. It used judgment, and specifically any judgment regarding the granting of relief. and nobody has identified any instance in which the INA uses judgment in the sweeping way suggested by the 11th Circuit.

Christopher J. Fleming 1:00

To the extent there's any doubt, though, it is resolved by the strong presumption of reviewability of agency action. And that's especially so because the 11th Circuit's position undisputedly bars all judicial review, even for errors of law, of the numerous adjustment of status decisions that are made outside of removal proceedings by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. The court-appointed amicus does not deny that or attempt to justify it. That's enough to resolve this case. The Court does not need to resolve the slight difference between our reading and the government's. We all agree it does not affect Mr. Patel's situation. And to the extent that this Court does reach it, we believe our reading is preferable, both because it gives full meaning to the phrase regarding the granting of relief.

Christopher J. Fleming 1:45

The government does not, but rather treats it as though it weren't even in the statute. And also because our reading is easily administrable. Jurisdictional lines should be clear. And our line is clear. Threshold decisions regarding eligibility are not subject to B-1. The discretionary decision to grant relief to an eligible noncitizen is. And again, if there's any doubt, the strong presumption of reviewability breaks the tie in our favor. And I'd welcome the Court's questions.

Clarence Thomas 2:10

Counsel, normally we review judgments or orders and not reasoning. It seems as though you're asking us to review reasoning as opposed to the order itself.

Christopher J. Fleming 2:28

So, Justice Thomas, the review in an immigration case is of a final order of removal. And as this Court said in Chadha, the final order of removal subsumes everything that goes before. The question for purposes of interpreting the jurisdictional bar is, is what Congress meant by the phrase any judgment regarding the granting of relief.

Clarence Thomas 2:47

Well, that seems pretty broad.

Christopher J. Fleming 2:50

Well, Congress in immediately neighboring sections used far broader terms in the preamble to B. It says judgment, decision, or action, but then B.1 only catches judgment, whereas B.2 uses decision or action, which are broader terms. Subsection A.1 talks about any individual determination, which is much broader. Had Congress wished to bar any possible determination that goes into evaluating an application for adjustment of status, it could have said any individual determination, any decision or action, or the final order of removal, which is in administrative law and certainly in immigration law, the final decision of the agency that includes everything that has gone before. So if

Clarence Thomas 3:33

you wanted to accomplish what Amicus argues, how would you have written?

Christopher J. Fleming 3:41

any decision or action under sections and then the five types of removal, which is the language that Congress used in B-2. It simply qualified it by saying the decision or action has to be specified by statute in the Attorney General's discretion. And there are additional contextual clues, but I think those are the main ones. But I

Clarence Thomas 4:04

don't see any real difference between what you suggest would do the job versus what's already there.

Christopher J. Fleming 4:11

So there are two differences, Justice Thomas. One is the word judgment in administrative law and immigration law is used in a narrow way to mean a discretionary determination or discretionary decision.