PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc. (17-1705)

argument 17-1705

PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc.

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 0m 7 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 6 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central legal issue the Court is reviewing in PDR Network v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument first this morning in case 17-1705, PDR Network v. Carlton and Harris Chiropractic. Mr. Phillips.

John P. Phillips 0:09

Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. The most startling comment in the Fourth Circuit's opinion in this case is the following one. We need not harmonize the FCC's rule with the underlying statute. I would have thought in any ordinary instance of judicial review of administrative agency decision-making that That's a statement that ought to leap out off the page. And when it's being applied in the context of a private right of action brought as a class action by private plaintiffs against a private defendant who is seeking to assert that the statute is not violated by the action of the defendant, the idea that the Court of Appeals will say, no, no, there's no opportunity and no reason for the courts to entertain the agency's standard to be applied in those circumstances is one

John P. Phillips 0:57

that it would seem to me you could only justify in extraordinary circumstances that are candidly

Elena Kagan 1:01

presented. That's a bit what's unusual about this case. It's a different question whether the Court of Appeals can do it, because the Hobbs Act gives it exclusive jurisdiction, and I think that exclusive jurisdiction has to mean something, and that it then doesn't become a matter of jurisdiction. It becomes a matter of how much, if any deference, this interpretation is due, then the question we granted cert on, which is what does the district court, what can the district court do as opposed to the Court of Appeals? So here, the district court, I understand, didn't think it was challenging the validity of the order, or that you were, of the effort. D.C. interpretation. It was interpreting it.

John P. Phillips 1:56

Right.

Elena Kagan 1:56

But it was interpreting

John P. Phillips 1:57

it in light of the statute, candidly.

Elena Kagan 2:00

Well, but yes, I agree with you. It's interpreting, but that's what applied challenges are about, aren't they? Here's the statute. Here's the interpretation. Your facts are unique. And we now, as judges, decide whether or not that uniqueness falls within or without the the interpretive guideline or the statute. It's a normal process. Right.

John P. Phillips 2:28

There are two things that come out of that question that I'd like to address. The first one is, what is the work that's done by the requirement of exclusive jurisdiction in the Hobbs Act? And we would say that the exclusive jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act says the Court of Appeals can decide whether and only, you know, whether they can enjoin, set aside, suspend and haul

Elena Kagan 2:49

or impart. Put that aside because that's Assuming I don't accept that, that the Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction, period, and we have plenty of statutes that give courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction over matters. So if you're not challenging the validity of the Hobbs Act, how do you — and you accept it on its face, what happens?

John P. Phillips 3:11

Well, I accept it on its face.

Elena Kagan 3:12

Just

John P. Phillips 3:13

with a different interpretation. Right. Well, I guess that's the problem, is it's difficult for me to sort of sweep away what does it mean to determine the validity

Elena Kagan 3:20

of. Well, let's assume we just accept where we've always been. Isn't this a Eucharist case? If the Court of Appeals is the only body that can determine the validity of an administrative holding or an administrative final order, do you lose? Yes. No, well,

John P. Phillips 3:43

I think if you're relying on IACUS to get to that proposition, it's hard to do that without taking into account the specific circumstances and the statutory language in IACUS. Because IACUS didn't just say that the Court of Appeals has exclusive authority to do the injunctive work and the declaratory work. But it went further, and this Court upheld it under these circumstances, coupled with the provision that, quote, no court, federal, state, or territorial, shall have jurisdiction or power to consider the validity of any such regulation. And it was the coupled with language that makes IACUS what it is. IACUS doesn't answer the question of whether the provision of exclusive jurisdiction goes beyond the ordinary situation of seeking injunctive relief or equitable relief, including declaratory relief.