Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (15-606)
argument 15-606Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado
Supreme Court of the United States
59 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the central issue the Court is being asked to decide in Pena‑Rodriguez v. Colorado?
We'll hear argument next in case fifteen six oh six. Daniel Rodriguez versus Colorado. Mr Fisher?
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Roughly half the trials in this country, from New York to California to South Carolina, are already conducted under the rule we seek today. namely a requirement that judges consider evidence of racial bias when it's offered to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. This court should require Cal Colorado to follow the same rule. Indeed, Colorado already has a turnkey system for implementing an exception to racial bias. Like every other jurisdiction across the land, Colorado already has multiple exceptions to the principle of jury secrecy. So all Colorado has to do is use that same system already in place to administer an exception for racial bias.
What about religious bias? Same thing in this case, except it's it's not you know, m this is how Mexicans act, this is this is how Catholics or Jews act. So they're obviously guilty. Wouldn't that also come under your exception?
Well there is obviously Mr Chief Justice frequently an overlap between race and religion and so for that reason religion might be viewed very similarly. All right, well
that seems to be avoiding the question. Let's say there isn't. I don't know. Catholics.
All the court needs to decide in this case today is race.
No, I don't think that's fair. Departments, once we decide race, this is not an equal protection case. It's a Sixth Amendment case. So we think invocation of race is an impermissible uh impermissible enough, I guess, that we will pierce the jury uh confidentiality. Well the next case is going to be religion. So if whatever we say on race is going to have to have Either a limiting principle that makes sense or it's going to open up a broad category of cases.
I don't deny that there may be subsequent cases if you decide this one in my favor. But I'm saying two things to the court. First of all, you can and should do what the Court's done in previous situations like this, which is start with race. And the reason why is because the Court has said time and again in cases like Rose against Mitchell, uh in cases like ham against South Carolina, that race is different. Race is unique. It is a unique situation of the U.S. Well suppose
we start with race. Suppose we start with race, and then the next case involves religion. Now how would you distinguish re uh religion from race, if we were to reach an opposite conclusion in the religious case.
What you would do in that case, um Justice Alito, is conduct the same analysis you're asking you're being asked to conduct here. which is look at the tanner factors and ask how effective other safeguards are in rooting out. Pardon
me?
Why? Why would you ask that question?
But the sixth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment, correct? I always thought the most pernicious and odious discrimination in our law is based on race. I agree with that. All right. So Why is a rule that says, given the exceptions we have recognised Since the eighteen hundreds, that have said that race is the most pernicious thing in our justice system. Why can't we limit this just to race using principles of the fourteenth Amendment as well?
I'm not denying that you can. And of course the Constitution needs to be read structurally.
So
not only is you think it's
odious to have the same sort of discrimination against someone because he's a Muslim? Say or uh uh practices uh Islamic faith. You say he's he's uh uh a Muslim. Of course, you know, given this, I know how Muslims behave, he committed this crime. Is that not sufficiently like racial discrimination that it should be carved out?
It may well be, Your Honor. Uh it it certainly is odious. And so,
sexual orientation, somebody gives us you know, a bigoted uh uh uh speech in the jury room about sexual orientation and how b particular types of people are more likely to commit crimes like the one before them. Is that sufficiently odious?
It's quite odious, but whether it would satisfy the balancing test we're setting forth today would be needed to decide.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central issue the Court is being asked to decide in Pena‑Rodriguez v. Colorado?
0:00–6:14
2
How do the parties argue that racial bias differs from religious or other forms of bias in jury deliberations?
6:14–12:55
3
Why does the Sixth Amendment require a different analysis for racial bias versus other identity‑based biases?
12:55–19:54
4
What evidence do the advocates cite about how states currently handle exceptions to the no‑impeachment rule?
19:54–26:36
5
How do the parties use Batson and related case law to support their positions on bias exceptions?
26:36–35:03
6
What procedural safeguards are proposed for investigating alleged bias after a verdict?
35:03–42:01
7
How do the counsel address the potential impact of extending the rule to gender, sexual orientation, or political affiliation?
42:01–50:17
8
Why do the petitioners claim that race is a unique constitutional problem that justifies a special rule?
50:17–59:09