Pereida v. Barr (19-438)

argument 19-438

Pereida v. Barr

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 4m 7 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 5 days ago official recording ↗

▲ 0

Transcript

jump: chapters · speakers · find in transcript

Transcript

Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.

What is the main topic discussed in this episode?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument next in case nineteen four hundred thirty eight. Parada versus bar. Mr. Goldman?

Nicholas A. Goldman 0:08

Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. There is no dispute that the INA requires an applicant for relief to show that he has not been convicted of a disqualifying offense. The main question here is just whether he can rely on the categorical approaches least acts presumption to meet that burden of proof. Justice parties may rely on presumptions to satisfy their burdens of proof in many other areas. He can for two reasons. First for decades. The statutory term convicted has been understood to require a categorical approach under which a past offense won't lead to mandatory removal or an enhanced sentence unless the record of conviction establishes every element of a federal predicate offense to a legal certainty.

What is the statutory requirement for an immigration applicant to prove they have no disqualifying conviction?

Nicholas A. Goldman 0:56

So we always presume that a conviction stands for nothing more than the least that the record of conviction establishes. And that rule works the same under the categorical and modified categorical approaches because courts can look to the least of the alternative elements under a divisible statute, as this court has. Second, Congress didn't disturb that rule when it enacted a general burden of proof provision that says nothing about convictions. And that's not surprising because all we're talking about is a gatekeeping step. There is still the discretionary step where the attorney general is unbound by the categorical approach and can make an individualized determination about who gets relief. So ultimately

Nicholas A. Goldman 1:40

It doesn't matter whether you think of the modified categorical approach as raising a question of law Or a question of fact. Because it's common for presumptions to operate on questions of fact too. And what matters is instead that the least acts presumption always governs the analysis And because it supplies a default answer, there is never any residual ambiguity for a burden of proof to resolve.

John G. Roberts 2:05

Council um I I think your uh friend on the other side um might agree that it doesn't matter so much Whether it's uh factual or legal, uh at least that's not the underlying reason. um that you have uh this this distinction between ACA uh and the uh immigration statute uh under uh ACA uh the government has the burden uh of uh showing that the increased sentence um is warranted, uh so it has to carry the burden of looking to the lease uh uh elements uh approach. Um but it's different when you're seeking uh uh the benefit of uh removal uh under the immigration case. There the person who's seeking has the burden of that benefit uh uh is your client and uh therefore you have the burden of showing uh uh the most elements approach for the prior uh uh conviction.

John G. Roberts 3:06

Why isn't it simply uh the different burdens under uh ACA and the immigration statute that account for the fact that in one case um

How does the “least‑acts presumption” operate under the categorical and modified categorical approaches?

John G. Roberts 3:17

uh uh the different b burden of going forward, whether you're seeking a greater sentence or seeking the benefit of removal, why doesn't that simply account for the allocation of the burden of proof? And it's Just in incidental that in your case you have a factual question of whether or not subsection C uh was the uh section of conviction or not.

Nicholas A. Goldman 3:39

Uh two responses to that, Mr Chief Justice. First, the government is not actually arguing that the least acts presumption and the burden of proof are opposite ends of a single spectrum because the government acknowledges that even where the non-citizen bears the burden of proof, the least acts presumption still does apply, at least at the categorical step of the analysis. So those two aren't um i inversely related in the way that your honor's question suggests. But also second even in contexts where the government has borne the burden of proof, that has not been what has animated the decision under the categorical approach. And in fact the standard that the court has adopted, which is this demand for certainty, or I think synonymously a requirement that the conviction necessarily establish every element goes far beyond the burden of proof that the government would face.