Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn. (13-1041)
argument 13-1041Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn.
Supreme Court of the United States
52 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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Transcript
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What is the APA’s rule‑making exemption for interpretive rules and why does it matter?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case thirteen ten forty one, Perez versus the Mortgage Bankers Association and Nichols versus the Mortgage Bankers Association.
Mr.
Needler?
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The Administrative Procedure Act expressly exempts interpretive rules from the requirement for notice and comment rulemaking. And the APA defines rulemaking as the an agency process for Formulating for amending or repealing a rule. Thus, an agency's amendment or repeal of an interpretive rule, just like the initial issuance, is exempt from notice and comment rulemaking. Under the DC Circuits Paralyzed Veterans Doctrine, however, once an agency gives a definitive interpretation of a rule, it cannot significantly modify that interpretation without going through notice and comment rules.
Is there some background principle um that should guide our decision here that in that in a close case an interpretive rule is preferable to a regulation or vice versa. Because it seems to me it would help you Uh In your case, if you said that interpretive rules serve an important function and the paralyzed veterans uh a decision i is an incentive not to adopt an interpretive interpretation.
Right. I think that's absolutely correct. First of all, the uh the question of whether this is an interpretive rule is not uh is not before the court. That was conceded below. But it but it is of critical importance for agencies to be able to issue interpretive rules and this is reflected in the in the passage of the APA uh itself. The committee reports show that that the um not imposing obstacles to agencies issuing interpretations was designed to encourage them to m let the public know what their interpretations of the statutes and rules that they have.
And if I am a an agency head and you're Uh my attorney, do you advise me? That interpretive rules are often preferred to regulations?
Well, I d I I I think it depends. And and and again, this is a principal uh purpose of of what the APA uh did. The APA did not prohibit an agency from going through notice on comment rulemaking or other or other uh public participation in the case of an interpretive rule. It it left to the agency the decision whether uh to do that. So in some circumstances the agency might choose to have very specific regulations, in other circumstances the agency may choose to have interpretation
so much uh mainly because of this court's interpretations. Uh Was it not the uh envisioned by the original APA? that substantive rules uh had to have notice in comment. Because they would indeed be uh reviewed by courts on the basis of uh uh abuse of discretion. I mean, you know, whether it's twenty five centimeters or two hundred fifty centimeters for a particular substantive rule, there's no way for a court to say that uh that's right or wrong. Whereas it was certainly envisioned by the original APA, was it not? That interpretive rules would not be given any deference by the courts, and that's why there didn't have to be notice in comment. Because the APA says in so many words that all issues of law shall be decided by the court.
Yes, but the the question of of deference w when an agency or excuse me when a court is deciding a question of law, that takes into account the agency's interpretation. This is this is demonstrated by Chevron, because if the Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. You can say that, but that's not what anybody
thought when the APA was passed.
Well uh uh a as we point out in a re reply brief, it was it was understood that there would be principles of deference to the to agency interpretations, and beyond that with respect to interpretations of uh legislative regulation, Seminole Rock was actually decided before the APA was passed. And so the the principle of of courts giving deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation was
What about m Mr. Needler, this particular Kind of um interpretation. Is is this an unusual situation or in classifying Uh employees for purposes of the Fair Labour Standards Act. Does has the agency changed its mind about an initial classification?
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the APA’s rule‑making exemption for interpretive rules and why does it matter?
0:01–7:16
2
How does the “Paralyzed Veterans” doctrine limit agency changes to interpretive rules?
7:16–14:18
3
When must an agency treat an interpretive rule as a legislative rule requiring notice‑and‑comment?
14:18–22:44
4
What is the significance of the 2006 vs. 2010 Mortgage Bankers interpretations under the Fair Labor Standards Act?
22:44–29:42
5
How do Chevron and Seminole Rock deference doctrines apply to changing agency interpretations?
29:42–34:14
6
Why might retroactive application of a new interpretation be barred under the Portal‑to‑Portal Act?
34:14–40:24
7
What arguments do the parties make about the proper scope of judicial deference in this case?
40:24–45:46
8
How does the Court’s decision resolve whether the 2010 AI is an interpretive or substantive rule?
45:46–52:55