Perttu v. Richards (23-1324)

argument 23-1324

Perttu v. Richards

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 16m 8 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 1 month ago official recording ↗

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What is the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion requirement and why does it matter?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument next in case 231324, Pertwee v. Richards. Ms. Sherman.

Unknown 0:06

Mr. Chief Justice, I may have pleased the court. Exhaustion is the centerpiece of Congress's reforms under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Yet even with this invigorated exhaustion requirement, prisoner lawsuits still account for an outsized share of filings in federal district courts. A rule that requires a jury trial on intertwined exhaustion issues would increase this burden while incentivizing non-exhaustion and undermining the goals and structure of the PLRA. Respondent would have this court cast aside the PLRA's goals and structure merely because exhaustion is an affirmative defense. Focusing on this court's holding in Jones v. Spock, he contends that there's no principled reason for treating PLRA exhaustion differently than other affirmative defenses that are routinely sent to juries when there are facts intertwined with the merits.

Unknown 0:58

Jones does not stand for this broad proposition. It held only that prisoners need not plead exhaustion. And there is a principled reason for treating PLRA exhaustion differently than other affirmative defenses. It is a mandatory prerequisite to suit, so its intended benefits would be entirely undercut by merits discovery and a trial before its resolution. PLRA exhaustion must be resolved by a judge at the early stages of litigation. Contrary to the Sixth Circuit, this does not run afoul of the Seventh Amendment, even when there are intertwined facts. The judge's determination on exhaustion does not interfere with the jury's ultimate fact-finding role, because dismissal is typically without prejudice, and the judge's determination on exhaustion would not have preclusive effect.

Unknown 1:49

Richards, like many other prisoners, can exhaust, come back, and have a jury decide the merits of any viable claims. For this reason, this Court should reverse the Sixth Circuit's decision. I welcome the Court's questions.

Clarence Thomas 2:03

Are exhaustion determinations normally made by the judge?

Unknown 2:08

They are. In fact, lower courts are pretty much in agreement that, at least when there are no intertwined facts, that judges will make those determinations.

Clarence Thomas 2:18

So what is it about the intertwining of facts that changes the nature of exhaustion?

Unknown 2:27

I don't think there's anything that changes the nature of exhaustion. I think what it does is it makes one have to consider the Seventh Amendment now. If there are intertwined facts, is that an implication of the Seventh Amendment? And our position is that it doesn't.

Clarence Thomas 2:46

Historically, do we have any analogs that would suggest that this would go to a jury?

Unknown 2:59

No, in fact, the opposite is true. The analog suggests that this would go to a judge. We think that the closest analog—there was no precise analog. There was no exhaustion in 1791. The doctrine hadn't been developed yet. It came as the administrative setting was coming into force. But we know that exhaustion has its roots in equity. And we think that the most at least appropriate analogs here are equitable defenses. And equitable defenses that would have been their key characteristic is a deference to another setting. Do we really

Ketanji Brown Jackson 3:43

have to get into that? I guess what I was a little confused about from your briefing was that I took you to concede that there's intertwinement here. And if that's the case, we can just assume, I guess, that exhaustion does not entitle you to a jury. That's the part of this that would ordinarily say you don't get a jury, but it's the fact of intertwinement that brings to the fore the question of whether or not the Seventh Amendment has to be satisfied. So we don't really have to worry or think about or rule on whether or not the exhaustion claim gets a jury independent of the other one, right?

Unknown 4:27

I don't think the court has to rule on that. I think it's a question that is naturally embedded in the question presented. I understand, but if I assume

Ketanji Brown Jackson 4:34

it, okay, so fine. Aren't we still faced with the question that you present as a matter of your question presented is, then we have intertwinement of a a claim that does not get a jury, the exhaustion claim, with a claim that does.