Peter v. NantKwest, Inc. (18-801)
argument 18-801Peter v. NantKwest, Inc.
Supreme Court of the United States
54 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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What is the central legal question about Section 145 expenses in Peter v. NantKwest?
Your argument next in case eleven eight zero one, Peter v. Nantquest. Mr.
Stewart? Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. An unsuccessful patent applicant may seek judicial review through either a direct appeal to the Federal Circuit under 35 U.S.C. 141 or a district court suit under Section 145. Section 145 states that an applicant who files suit under that provision must pay all the expenses of the proceeding. The question presented here is whether those expenses include money that the PTO spends. to employ lawyers and paralegals who assist with the agency's defense of the suit. For three principal reasons, the answer to that question is yes. First, the term expenses unambiguously encompasses costs. uh uh encompasses money paid to employees or other personnel to accomplish an un a particular task.
And unlike the term costs, which has a similarly broad common meaning, this court has not construed the term expenses as a legal term of art with a more limited scope. Second, requiring Patent applicants who file suit under Section 145 to pay personnel expenses of the PTO is consistent with the overall statutory scheme. Congress has directed the PTO to charge fees that are sufficient to cover its aggregate operating costs, including personnel expenses. And the PTO has developed fee schedules that, in a rough and ready way, require applicants who cause the agent To incur greater expenses to pay more in the way of fees. And Section 145 applicants put the PTO to a particular expenses, and it is therefore consistent with the logic of the statute to require them to pay more.
And third, it is especially appropriate to require Section 145 plaintiffs to pay the PTO's personnel expenses because Section 141 is available. as an alternative means of obtaining judicial review. Section 141 is not a cut rate or substandard mode of judicial review. It is ordinary, on the record, APA style judicial review, and it contains no requirement that the the applicant who chooses that course must pay the PTO's personnel expenses. And so it's not a good idea.
Mr. Stewart, is there a any other federal statute. That provides for Attorney's fees. on the basis of the word expenses alone. As you know, there are expenses and attorneys' fees, expenses including attorney's fees, But what other statute provides for attorney's fees simply on the basis of the word Expenses.
We are not aware of any unless you include the trademark analog to this provision, and presumably the government's position on those two statutes will rise or fall together. We are frankly not aware of any other Federal statute that uses the term expenses standing alone. That is, as Your Honor's question suggests, when Congress has provided for shifting of expenses, it typically makes clear that it intends to uh provide for payment of attorneys fees i in in the course of doing that, but sometimes it says expenses including attorney's fees, sometimes expenses and attorneys' fees. How about to the losing
party? Are there other statutes that provide for fees, attorneys' fees? Uh that uh are awarded against the prevailing party?
I mean the the only one we are aware there there are two categories of those. There are there are Sibelius versus chlor, the the Vaccine Act, and that was an unusual situation. There are also statutes that provide discretion to award attorneys' fees without specifying that the app the person who receives the fees must obtain some degree of litigation success. And in that context the The Court has construed those discretionary provisions as requiring a degree of litigation of success. But I would say a couple of things about that aspect. Trevor Burrus, Jr.: And called it a radical departure to do otherwise. Well, it it would be in the context of ordinary fee shifting provisions. I think this is an important point that if you ask
Is it unusual, is it a departure from the norm, either to require an adverse litigant to pay the government's personnel expenses or to require the prevailing party to pay? The answer is If you compare it to other adversarial litigation involving the government, yes, it is unusual.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central legal question about Section 145 expenses in Peter v. NantKwest?
0:04–7:31
2
How does the brief define “expenses” and why does it include PTO personnel costs?
7:31–15:23
3
Why does the government argue that Section 145 expenses differ from ordinary “costs”?
15:23–23:31
4
How does the American rule apply to attorney‑fee shifting in this case?
23:31–29:48
5
What historical statutes and congressional intent support the expenses‑including‑attorneys‑fees view?
29:48–35:09
6
How are the actual PTO personnel and expert‑witness fees calculated for the case?
35:09–40:28
7
Why does the government claim the fee‑shifting requirement is a matter of fairness and policy?
40:28–46:28
8
What are the final arguments and the Court’s decision regarding fee recovery?
46:28–54:39