Peugh v. United States (12-62)
argument 12-62Peugh v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
59 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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Transcript
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What is the central dispute over the retroactive application of the 2009 sentencing guidelines?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case twelve sixty two, Pew versus United States. Mr. Canarr.
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. In sentencing petitioner Marvin Pugh, The district court applied the two thousand nine Guidelines Sentencing Range. of seventy to eighty seven months. rather than the nineteen ninety eight range of thirty seven to forty six months applicable at the time of his defense. Retroactive application of harsher guidelines passed after the offence violates the ex post facto clause if it is If it creates a significant risk. increased punishment. The government here objects that a guidelines amendment does not change the law, but that is incorrect. The guidelines are legislative rules. That define a term of a mandatory statute. namely subsection A four of section eighteen USC excuse me, a mandatory schedule?
Excuse me. A mandatory schedule, you say? No, it it's a term of a man of a mandatory statute, subsection A four of eighteen USC three five three. That provision. requires the district court To consider The guideline sentencing range and I'll quote established for the applicable category of offence committed by the applicable category. of offender. So in nineteen ninety eight The gu that statute, the law mandated. That the district court uh shall consider. As applied to pews offense in offender category, a sentencing range of thirty seven to forty six months.
Well let's say you prevail and the case is remanded for resentencing. Is there anything that would prevent the district court from saying, you know, before the promulgation of the new guidelines, I thought the range in the old guidelines was about right for this offense. But now that I've seen the new guidelines, I think that those really uh fit best under the factors that I have to consider. uh under the statute in determining the correct sentence. So I'm going to reimpose exactly the same sentence, not because it's required by the guidelines. In fact I'm going to go outside the guidelines. I just think with the enlightenment that the new guidelines have provided me that that's the best sentence. Would that be would there be an ex post facto problem there?
No, it would not, Your Honor. You would under the statute have to follow all the steps in the Rita Gaulle framework. But the district court is always able to consider any new developments that it wants. What we're talking about is a change of law. And that was the point I was just getting to. Well,
it's not a change of the law if if if the law does not require the guidelines to be imposed. Your your case rests upon the proposition you stated at the outset, which is that the ex post facto law uh applies prohibition applies if there is a substantial possibility of a of a higher s was was that the language you used? Substantial uh significant risk of significant risk. Suppose uh suppose uh the district judge for the federal district in which uh somebody's crime was committed was a uh bleeding heart judge. He always gave the lowest sentence possible, and everybody knew that. And he is replaced. He retires. uh after the arrest, after the crime, and he is replaced by Maximum John. У everybody knows gives the highest sentence.
Every time. Ex ex post facto violation?
No, because the ex post facto clause only applies to laws or here delegated law making. And here's where the change in the law Was your honor. As I mentioned In nineteen ninety eight the law required the district court to consider a sentencing range of thirty seven to forty six months. With the guidelines amendment, the law changed. The law now required the district court for that category of offender and offense to consider as the
Is that what your definition of legal consequence is?
So the
heart taking You're disagreeing with the proposition of our older cases. that to be for there to be an ex post facto violation you have to have a legal consequence.
No, not at all, you know. The legal consequence is the is the ultimate sentence imposed and in Morales and Lynch the court said
there's a disconception They are still.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central dispute over the retroactive application of the 2009 sentencing guidelines?
0:01–6:27
2
How do the parties define and apply the “significant risk” test for ex‑post‑facto violations?
6:27–13:46
3
What role do statistical and empirical studies play in assessing guideline impact?
13:46–20:14
4
How does the Court’s presumption of reasonableness affect appellate review of guideline sentences?
20:14–26:40
5
In what ways do mandatory versus advisory guidelines influence a district court’s discretion?
26:40–35:20
6
What policy arguments are presented about the effect of guideline amendments on sentencing uniformity?
35:20–43:10
7
How do hypothetical scenarios illustrate the boundaries between procedural and substantive changes?
43:10–51:06
8
What are the final arguments and conclusions regarding the ex‑post‑facto claim in Peugh v. United States?
51:06–59:30