Plumhoff v. Rickard (12-1117)

argument 12-1117

Plumhoff v. Rickard

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 0m 7 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 4 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central legal issue being argued in Plumhoff v. Rickard?

John G. Roberts 0:01

We'll hear argument this morning in case twelve, eleven, seventeen, Plumhoff versus Rickard. Mr. Mosley.

Mr. Mosley 0:07

Mr. Chief Justice, I may it please the court. The Sixth Circuit completely failed to analyze the second prong of a qualified immunity defense in this case, and that is whether the law was clearly established at the time of the incident in question, such that every reasonable officer would know whether or not the action was constitutional or not. Uh therefore The petitioners were not given fair warning that the use of force in this case, if it was prohibited, was prohibited. And they retain immunity and the Sixth Circuit must be reversed. This is the argument we we wish to emphasize today uh relating to the second prong, what was traditionally the second prong, uh before Saucier, of course, the rigid order of battle was changed.

Mr. Mosley 0:47

Um had the Sixth Circuit reviewed its own cases. As of two thousand four, it should have concluded that that petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity.

Antonin Scalia 0:59

I thought it said, did it not say in its opinion that there was uh room for disagreement o over whether this was reasonable or not? Did you have some such statement?

Mr. Mosley 1:12

they could not conclude that it was reasonable as a matter of law, is the statement I recall, Justice Scalia. And and in that regard, that's a legal question. It had to answer that question. But it didn't do so with reference to prior case law to two thousand four. If anything, it looked at Scott versus Harris from two thousand seven and said that there was a factual uh uh distinction between Scott and the devil was in the details, and therefore uh it affirmed the district court, which I can I Submit made the same mistake because the district court was looking at Smith versus Cup from the Sixth Circuit, which was a two thousand five opinion. uh to determine whether or not the officers violated clearly established law.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg 1:54

I would the court in in your view ever have an occasion to decide whether conduct of this nature violates the Fourth Amendment. If you you were right about uh clearly clearly established uh then could this could the underlying constitutional question. ever be what would be the posture of a case. In which it could be decided.

Mr. Mosley 2:20

Well I mean it sir uh we've argued of course in our briefs uh Justice Ginsburg that it should be decided in this case, although today we're emphasizing the second prong, but what would be the posture of such a case? The United States has suggested that there's factual complexities in this case that make it difficult for the court to rule uh whether or not on the merits there was a constitutional violation. And I'm not uh of course we we differ with that to the extent that we've argued there was not a constitutional violation. But as in Pearson. where the issue of whether the law was clearly established can be resolved relatively easily I sus I submit that that in this case that is the case, and uh the court should rule that uh the petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity.

Mr. Mosley 3:05

Isn't that the case that the court

Samuel A. Alito 3:07

has discretion uh to reach uh the second prong if it wants to. The court could say. It wasn't reasonably it it wasn't clearly established, but it was an unreasonable seizure. It could do that, couldn't it?

Mr. Mosley 3:21

Uh the way I read Pearson, Justice Salito, no. The way I read Pearson, they uh Pearson's uh dictate is that they must uh proceed to the second uh prong if they conclude there was uh r uh sufficient facts to to uh uh conclude that there was a constitutional violation. They still have to decide. One is a question of although

Samuel A. Alito 3:41

that wasn't my question. The the the court has to if uh ruling on qualified immunity, it has to decide whether uh there wa th whether the law was reasonably yes the rule that's being applied was reasonab w was clearly uh established. But having done that, no ma uh if even if it says it was and therefore the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, doesn't Pearson say that the court has discretion about whether to go on to the second prong?

Mr. Mosley 4:06

Oh, this is uh in relation to Justice Ginsburg's question.