Pugin v. Garland (22-23)
argument 22-23Pugin v. Garland
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 39m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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Transcript
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What is the Supreme Court’s central question about obstruction of justice in Pugin v. Garland?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case twenty two, twenty three, Hugin versus Garland and the consolidated case.
Mr.
Gannon.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. In nineteen ninety six, Congress made an offense relating to obstruction of justice an aggravated felony for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act. At the time it did so, the phrase obstruction of justice was understood to include crimes that occurred when a proceeding or investigation was not currently pending. The wheels of justice can be obstructed even before they begin to move. Indeed, one of the best ways to obstruct an investigation or proceeding is to ensure that it never starts in the first place. My friends on the other side say that only 14 states plus D.C. even punished obstruction of justice in nineteen ninety six, and that Congress meant to limit obstruction of justice to a catch all offense in the Federal Criminal Code that includes a pending proceeding requirement.
But by nineteen ninety six, Congress had added other obstruction of justice offenses without any such limitation, and it had expressly disavowed such a limit in nineteen eighty two when creating the principal Federal Witness and Evidence Tampering Statute, eighteen USC fifteen twelve. Also by nineteen ninety six case law, dictionaries, leading commentators, and the Model Penal Code had all recognized that the kinds of offenses at issue in these two cases, accessory after the fact and witness tampering, involved obstruction of justice, even when the elements of the offense did not require there to be a pending investigation or proceeding at the time of the offense conduct. This court should hold that the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding otherwise.
I welcome the Court's question.
Uh Mr Gannon, could you give us a straightforward definition of uh obstruction of justice?
We agree with the definitions on page twenty three of our brief from Legal Dictionaries that obstruction of justice involves willfully interfering with the process of justice. And the board here said that the offenses at issue are the category that have as an affirmative act that includes a specific intent to interfere with the process of justice in law.
So you give a wide range of uh of evidence. You talk about Blackstone as well as Chapter seventy three. Do you think all the crimes listed there are obstruction of justice crimes? We think that there
Obstruction of justice crimes if they have the specific intent to interfere with an investigation. Now, we don't think that the investigation has to have already come into existence. It can be a future investigation in a retaliation case and can be a past investigation. But we think that it does, in most circumstances, going to require there to be a nexus. In all circumstances, there will need to be a nexus to a particular investigation or procedure. proceeding that could come about, uh but that comes through the specific intent to interfere with the process of justice and law. It doesn't need to already be in in existence at the time the conduct occurs.
Council, one of the things that troubles me about both sides' position is the relating to uh language. It seems to me that to the extent you have a broad definition uh of obstruction of justice becomes even broader when you say uh uh relating to. And of course, on the other side, the narrow definition, I don't know that it takes adequate account of that. So I understand the formulation in your brief. But could you flesh out a little bit more about how relating to works, particularly against your fairly broad definition of obstruction.
Well, I think ultimately we agree that relating to does broaden beyond just what would be core obstruction of justice, but the board here has recognized that the offenses that we're talking about are those that have the specific intent to interfere with proceedings of of law and justice. And so that we think is the ultimately the limiter here. Even though it would need to relate to obstruction of justice, we think to the extent that there is a
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Supreme Court’s central question about obstruction of justice in Pugin v. Garland?
0:00–11:19
2
How do the parties define “obstruction of justice” and why does the definition matter?
11:19–27:18
3
Why is the “pending proceeding” requirement a point of contention between the sides?
27:18–40:32
4
What does the phrase “relating to obstruction of justice” add to the statutory analysis?
40:32–52:32
5
How does Chapter 73 of the U.S. Code influence the generic obstruction‑of‑justice offense?
52:32–1:02:58
6
In what ways do retaliation offenses and accessory‑after‑the‑fact differ for the Court’s analysis?
1:02:58–1:15:49
7
What arguments are made about the “generic” obstruction‑of‑justice crime versus specific state statutes?
1:15:49–1:27:07
8
What conclusions do the advocates draw about the proper standard for categorizing aggravated felonies?
1:27:07–1:39:07