Quarles v. United States (17-778)

argument 17-778

Quarles v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States 55 min 6 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 6 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central legal issue being argued in Quarles v. United States?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument first this morning in case seventeen seven seven eight, quarrels versus United States. Mr Marwell?

Unknown 0:07

Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. For centuries, the essence of burglary has been punishing those who trespass for the purpose of committing a crime. That was the rule of common law. It remained the majority view at the time of ACA and Taylor. For two main reasons, the court should confirm that generic burglary retains that traditional requirement of contemporaneous intent intent at the time of the initial trespass. First, the sources that matter under Taylor show that remaining in was understood as a modest expansion of the traditional offence. to cover those who entered lawfully but then overstay their welcome to commit a crime. But the government reads Taylor's use of that one word remaining in as a sharp break from that tradition.

Unknown 0:54

Under that view, remaining would cover anyone who enters unlawfully, regardless of whether they had that burglarious intent at the time of entry, as long as the intent was formed later. And nothing in Taylor or the sources that existed at the time of ACA suggest an intention or acknowledgement of making such a dramatic change. Well something something in Taylor. tugs the other way. That is, Taylor said that there would be few statutes that were broader. And the the generic. And and even in what nineteen eight eighty six there were more than a few statutes that are like the statute before us. Uh yes, Justice Ginsburg, the government claims there were six statutes as of or six states as of nineteen eighty-six that had defined remaining in burglary more broadly than than our definition.

Unknown 1:51

And I think that's well below the threshold. And in fact, Taylor contemplated that there would be a few. It gave the example of California in which shoplifting qualified as burglary. I thought it was higher. I thought it was somewhere between nine and fourteen. Well the uh the government claims six statutes. There were twenty nine statutes as of twenty-nine jurisdictions as of uh nineteen eighty six that had remaining invariants, but I think when you when you look at how the states had interpreted those and it uh and in some cases at the plain language of the statutes, I think the best reading of where those states were, uh it shows that a majority, even of the remaining in stat states, uh uh retain the traditional requirement of contemporary

Samuel A. Alito 2:34

If we look at the statutes in existence in nineteen eighty six. And we count only those in which there is a judicial opinion interpreting the statute on the remaining in question. and not those which contain dicta uh in cases involving um uh uh where the where there was a a an intent at the time of entry. What is the breakdown?

Unknown 3:02

Uh well as you know, we we think you should not only look at the Trevor Burrus I know you think we

Samuel A. Alito 3:07

should look more broadly. You want us to count all the statutes in which there is no remaining in burglary to start out with.

Unknown 3:14

Correct. Because Taylor refers Taylor instructs to look at how a majority of states define burglary and Well we

Samuel A. Alito 3:20

know that Taylor, the Taylor's definition of burglary includes remaining in, does it not? Correct. All right. So then why would we look at the the statutes that don't have any remaining in element at all? Because the

Unknown 3:33

twenty-two jurisdictions that had just entry burglary show a widespread adherence to that traditional rule that you needed intent at the time of entry. And the government's rule, the government's interpretation of the Taylor test. takes that away because they say if you enter unlawfully without any intent at the time and you form intent later, that's burglary and that's not consistent. That's much broader than the twenty two entry states. But I think if if if I could respond to the question about just looking at the twenty nine, there are states like Alaska, which has the Araby decision from nineteen eighty five, New York, which has the Lakata decision from nineteen seventy one, Connecticut, which has the Belton decision from ninety