R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC (18-107)

argument 18-107

R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC

Supreme Court of the United States 57 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 7 days ago official recording ↗
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What is the factual background of Amy Stevens’ termination at Harris Funeral Homes?

John G. Roberts 0:00
We'll hear argument next in case eighteen one hundred seven R G and G R Harris Funeral Homes versus the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Mr. Cole?
Aaron D. Cole 0:12
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Amy Stevens is a transgender woman. She was a valued employee of Harris Funeral Homes for six years. Until she told her boss that she was going to live and identify as a woman. When Harris Holmes responded by firing her It discriminated against her because of her sex for three reasons. First, in firing her for failing to conform to its owners explicitly stated stereotypes about how men and women should behave. It discriminated against her in the same way that Price Waterhouse discriminated against And Hopkins for failing to walk and talk more femininely. It can't be that Anne Hopkins would lose her case on the same facts were she transgender. Second Harris Holmes fired her for identifying as a woman.
Aaron D. Cole 1:11
only because she was assigned a male sex at birth. In doing so It fired her for contravening a sex specific expectation that applies only to people assigned male sex at birth, namely that they live and identify as a man for their entire lives. That is disparate treatment on the basis of sex. Third Harris Holmes fired her for, in its owner's words, changing her sex. That's discrimination in the same way that firing someone for changing their religion would be religious discrimination. That Harris Holmes would fire both transgender men for being insufficiently feminine. And transgender women? For being insufficiently masculine. is, as the government concedes, two acts of sex discrimination, not a defense. None of these arguments ask this court to redefine, or in Judge Posner's words, update
Aaron D. Cole 2:11
sex. They assume arguendo that sex means at a minimum Sex assigned at birth based on visible anatomy, or biological sex.
John G. Roberts 2:21
I under I understand that as the argument and I I I believe it's the same as the in in the prior case. Does that argument hold up when you get to specific work requirements. In other words, if uh objection of a transgender man transitioning to woman is that he should be allowed to use he or she should be allowed to use the women's bathroom. Now, how do you analyze that? I understand how you analyze status, as it were, and maybe that's hiring and firing on the basis treating it as just on the basis of sex. But when you get to specific policies, does that
Aaron D. Cole 3:04
Hold true. So first of all, Your Honor, how one how you answer this case will not resolve how you answer that case. Whether you rule against us or for us, the next case will arise in in the in the following sense. Address code that distinguishes on the basis of sex. Obviously is because of sex. The question then is does it impose a discriminatory term and condition? And as this court said in Burlington Northern, to discriminate is not just to differentiate, but to differentiate in a way that injures and
John G. Roberts 3:35
I think you're missing my my point, maybe because it wasn't carefully expressed, but it it is Uh Can the claim be I mean I understand when you say you're dealing with transgender status and you can't discriminate on that basis with on the basis of status. But when you get to the actual policy, do you analyze it as discrimination on the basis of sex, carrying forward your reasoning fr uh at at the outset or on the basis of uh transgender status. So if the objection of the transgender individual is that I want to use a bathroom consistent with my gender identity rather than biological sex, Do you analyze it as uh the affecting based on the transgender status, or do you analyze it on the basis of biological sex?
Aaron D. Cole 4:22
So uh the the I I think our argument rests on biological sex or what we think is more accurately referred to as sex assigned at birth. But here's here's the thing. If there is a this this case asks whether when someone fires someone, because they're transgender, or because they fail to conform to sex-based stereotypes, is that because of sex? That's what this case asks. Obviously a sex specific restroom policy is because of sex. So you're you're not we're not answering that question.

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