Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund of Operating Engineers and Participating Employers (12-992)

argument 12-992

Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund of Operating Engineers and Participating Employers

Supreme Court of the United States 57 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 7 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central issue the Court is addressing in Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund?

John G. Roberts 0:01

We'll hear argument next this morning in case twelve nine ninety two Ray Holleck Gravel Company versus the Central Pension Fund. Mr Himmelfarb?

Jonathan Himmelfarb 0:10

Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. It may it please the court. Twenty five years ago in Budinich versus Beckon Dickinson, this court unanimously held that a decision leaving unresolved a request for attorneys' fees Is a final decision subject to immediate appeal. The fee award in Budinich was authorized by a statute, but the same rule applies to fees awarded under a contract. In concluding otherwise, the First Circuit below held that Budinich may or may not apply to contractual attorneys' fees, depending upon whether the fee award in a particular case is deemed part of the merits or not. The First Circuit's rule is inconsistent with each of the core aspects of budinic. which is likely why respondents no longer defend it.

Jonathan Himmelfarb 0:54

Whereas Budinich held that its rule re applies regardless of whether the fees are deemed merits or non merits, that distinction is the very foundation of the First Circuit's rule. And whereas Budinich emphasised the need for clarity, consistency, predictability and practicality in jurisdictional rules, and thus for a uniform and bright line rule in this context. The first circuit's rule is case specific, fact intensive, abstract, And hard to apply. In short, the very antithesis of a uniform and bright line rule.

Unknown 1:25

As I understand it, the the first circuit position is not what's being defended. Instead it's the eleventh circuit position, which is a Right, Million.

Jonathan Himmelfarb 1:35

Well it's not a bright line rule, um, Justice Ginsburg. It's a different rule, but it's still a case specific fact intensive rule. The line is just drawn in a different place.

Unknown 1:53

And then Uh you you treat it as though it's a question of damage.

Jonathan Himmelfarb 1:58

Right. It's not a bright line rule in a number of respects. One of them is that Like the First Circuit, it relies on a distinction between merits and nonmerits fees, more specifically on what respondents call damages fees as opposed to cost fees. And Budinich says it's inappropriate to make this sort of case by case determination of whether a particular fee award is authorized

Anthony M. Kennedy 2:21

But I think that's not right, Mr. Himmelfarb. I mean the rationale that they use might have something to do with an underlying merits, non merits determination, but the test is just Does the statute authorize it, or is it authorized by contract?

Jonathan Himmelfarb 2:35

Right. And we would say two things about that. One of them is sort of a a practical point, a point about administrability, the one is an analytical point, a point about logic, or more specifically, illogic.

Anthony M. Kennedy 2:45

Well just focusing on whether that's a bright line rule or not, in other words, whether it's easy to apply or not, I thought you were suggesting Whatever is true about whether it makes any sense or whether it's conceptually justifiable, I thought you were suggesting it wasn't easy to apply, and it does seem to me that once you say Contractual provisions will be treated this way, statutory provisions will be treated that way. That's not a hard rule to implement.

Jonathan Himmelfarb 3:13

We actually think it is a hard rule to implement, or at least there are going to be cases where it's hard, and in fact this case. is an example. In this case, in the notice of motion for attorneys' fees of cost, this is on page seventy four of the joint appendix, respondents invoked only a statute, ERISA. In the supporting affidavit they invoked the statute and a contract. The district court interpreted their request apparently to be made under a statute and awarded fees invoking only the statute. Then the first circuit uh viewed this case as one in which fees were requested and awarded under a contract and that was the basis for its jurisdictional holding that's now on review before this court. So this case an exa is an example of one where it's not always clear.

Jonathan Himmelfarb 4:01

There c there are many cases where a statute in some capacity and a contract in some capacity are both in play. Where you potentially have two competing attorney's fees provisions, one statutory and one contractual.