Reed v. Goertz (21-442)

argument 21-442

Reed v. Goertz

Supreme Court of the United States 59 min 8 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 7 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central procedural issue Reed v. Gertz raises about when a Skinner claim accrues?

John G. Roberts 0:00

Your argument next in case twenty one four four four four four four four four four four four four two, Reed versus Goetz. Mr. Ryder Longmaid.

Unknown 0:07

Thank you, Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. A claim modelled after Skinner accrues at the end of the state court litigation seeking DNA testing. There are two sets of reasons why one doctrinal, the other practical. First, doctrinally, a Skinner claim challenges the law, not a judgment. So it makes sense to challenge what the state court of last resort authoritatively says the law means after that construction becomes final on denial of rehearing. By analogy, appellate review does not proceed until a lower court denies rehearing, and traditional due process claims aren't complete until the state's full procedures deny due process. The fact is rehearing can change reasoning and results.

Unknown 0:46

And while a Section nineteen eighty three prisoner need not exhaust, just as a litigant need not seek rehearing, the clock doesn't start ticking until the state court procedures have come to an end. Second, as a practical matter, tying accrual to the end of state court litigation is simple, predictable and sensible. Tying accrual to some earlier stage is not. Linking accrual to the trial court's judgment would disrespect the state court's appellate process and require a stay in almost every case. It would clutter dockets with protective complaints, motions, and amended complaints, and it raises more questions than it answers. The Fifth Circuit said Reed's claim accrued in twenty fourteen, but now Gert says twenty sixteen.

Unknown 1:27

Gertz's notice rule is unprincipled and unpredictable. It will burden courts and litigants alike with uncertain anal analyses comparing various state court opinions. Accrual before denial of rehearing isn't much better. It treats the state's rehearing process as irrelevant. It likewise threatens parallel litigation, especially in states with busy courts and short limitations periods. Here's a straightforward answer. A Skinner claim accrues at the end of the state court litigation. I welcome the court's questions.

Clarence Thomas 1:57

Counsel, could you s uh spend a minute on precisely what your liberty interest in that you've been deprived that you're that uh your client have been has been deprived of and who deprived him of it.

Unknown 2:11

Your Honor, of of course, as the Court recognized in Osborne the the liberty interest is proving one's innocence with newly discovered evidence. And so as the court said in Osborne as a matter of procedural due process, the procedures need to be fair to vindicate that interest. Here, the allegation of Mr. Reed's complaint is that there's a procedural due process violation based on the way the Court of Criminal Appeals in Texas interpreted Article sixty four. And it is Gertz, the respondent here, who's a district attorney, who is giving effect to uh that interpretation by continuing to deny uh DNA testing without due process of law because

Clarence Thomas 2:47

I mean by complying with the court ruling.

Unknown 2:50

I think he's enforcing the court ruling, Your Honor, by he I I would I would back up and say, as Texas recognizes on page five of the red brief, the the district attorney or Gertz has authority to uh allow DNA testing. So he has a choice. He can either allow it or he can say, I've looked at the construction of Article sixty four, I've looked at the way the CCA has interpreted it, and I'm going to not uh allow Reed to conduct DNA testing on the these items. And of and of course he's he he's enforcing Article sixty four in that way. If the court were to say to him, You must you must uh allow testing because uh read satisfies Article sixty four, then he would have to allow it. But in this case he's enforcing Article sixty four by not permitting testing.

Elena Kagan 3:32

He's permitted testing on some items, correct? He

Unknown 3:34

has permitted testing. Not

Elena Kagan 3:35

by court order, but by agreement.

Unknown 3:44

And of course, as I said, page five of the red brief cites a case called Sk Skinner versus State from twenty sixteen, where the C CA also makes clear that there is authority for district attorneys to permit testing.