Reynolds v. United States (10-6549)
argument 10-6549Reynolds v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
59 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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Transcript
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What legal question does Reynolds v. United States raise about the application of SORNA to pre‑enactment offenders?
We'll hear argument next in case ten sixty five forty nine, Reynolds versus United States. Miss Kane.
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Recognizing that certain offenders convicted before enactment or an implementation of Sorna would be unable to comply with Sorna's initial registration requirement. Congress included Section one hundred and six nine one three D delegating to the Attorney General the authority to determine whether and how to apply Sorna's registration requirements to those offenders. Mr Reynolds is one of those offenders because he was convicted, sentenced and released from prison a year before Sorna was enacted. But for a valid exercise of the Attorney General's authority under subsection D, Mr Reynolds had no obligation to register under Sorna. could not initially register under Sorna and therefore was not subject to Sorna's criminal penalties.
Action by the Attorney General was needed to bring offenders like Mr Reynolds into the new system. And because both implementing Sorna and determining whether and how Sorna would be applied to pre enactment offenders would require time and consideration. Congress left the Wetterling Act Registration Law in place for three years to ensure that all offenders would be covered under the old law. And it's not a good idea. The Wetterling Act, Your Honour, was remaining in place for three years and had a sort of a sunset provision under Oh no I
know that's going forward but w the was the requirement to register under the Wetterling Act did that apply as of the enactment date or did that reach back?
Your Honor, actually the Wetterling Act was not effective for a year. Into the future.
So you think it only applied to that? Year.
No, I'm sorry, the Wetterling Act was uh enacted in nineteen uh nineteen ninety six.
So if if the offence were committed in nineteen ninety four, did that person have to register under the Wetterling Act?
They had to register but there were no criminal penalties. At that point it was a nineteen ninety four law. called Wetterling and then two years later under the Lichner Act criminal penalties were added. Our reading better accords with the text and congressional intent.
By that answer. The are you admitting that there were no criminal enforcement options for the Attorney General under the Wetterling Act for acts committed prior to nineteen ninety six? Is that what you're saying?
Your Honor, the um The Wetterling Act, as it was enacted in nineteen ninety four, was a registration requirement without criminal penalties In nineteen ninety six, the Lichner Act was enacted amending Wetterling and added the criminal penalty, the federal criminal penalty of one year punishment for failure to register.
And that included all individuals who had commit who had been convicted of s of sex abuse acts before nineteen ninety six?
I don't know. Our reading better accords with the text of Sorna. and congressional intent. But the government reading is simply not reasonable. If sorta were to apply to all pre enactment and pre impl implementation offenders on day one, And the Attorney General could then modify in the future, which would in fact in effect repeal Sorna as to some offenders, then you could have a situation where someone was convicted of an offense And then have to be uh covered under sorta and then later the A G could decide that that group was not even registered. Maybe the Attorney General doesn't have that power. But Uh y your position is that whether this behavior not registering is criminal or not is left up to the Attorney General.
It is left up to the executive. Do we have other examples where Congress says, well we don't know whether this should be a criminal offence, so we're going to leave it to the Attorney General. is quite different to say the Attorney General will implement it in the technical details. But to say that Whether it's a criminal offence or not is up to the Attorney General. Is there any other instance where that's so. Your Honor not aware of any, but we don't uh this is not what the Attorney General is doing.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What legal question does Reynolds v. United States raise about the application of SORNA to pre‑enactment offenders?
0:02–7:06
2
How does the government argue that the Attorney General’s interim rule is valid despite lacking notice‑and‑comment?
7:06–12:57
3
Why does the petitioner claim that the Attorney General’s discretion to exempt offenders is unconstitutional?
12:57–18:35
4
What is the significance of the Wetterling Act and Lichenberg Act in interpreting SORNA’s registration requirements?
18:35–25:14
5
How do the parties interpret subsection D’s “safety valve” and its impact on retroactive application?
25:14–34:07
6
What arguments are made about the timing and “reasonable period” for initial registration under SORNA?
34:07–41:57
7
How do the justices’ questions illuminate the tension between congressional intent and agency authority?
41:57–50:35
8
What relief does the petitioner seek and why does the court consider remand appropriate?
50:35–59:23