Rico v. United States (24-1056)
argument 24-1056Rico v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
54 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 1 month ago
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Transcript
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What is the central question the Court is asked to decide in Rico v. United States?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case twenty four ten fifty six, RICO versus United States. Mr. Yunikowski.
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. The question in this case is not whether, but instead how to hold people accountable for absconding from supervised release. The text and history of the Sentencing Reform Act establish that Congress intended for revocation, not fugitive tolling, to be the means of addressing abscondment. To begin with the text, the effect of the government's position is that Miss Rico was subject to the conditions of supervised release for a period exceeding the time specified in her judgment, and there's no textual support for that result. The government claims that Miss Rico wasn't serving her sentence at all during the period of the abscondment. But that argument cannot be squared with the government's simultaneous contention that Ms.
Rico violated the conditions of supervisor release during that period, warranting an increased sentence. History supports Ms Rico's position. Contrary to the government's contention, there is no common law tradition of fugitive tolling for parole. Instead, fugitive tolling for parole came to exist via a nineteen seventy six statute and a nineteen eighty three implementing regulation. But in the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress prospectively repealed that statute and enacted nothing in its stead for supervised release, while leaving it intact for legacy parole cases, and it remains intact today. As a result, Congress has created a two track scheme. parole with fugitive tolling and supervised release without it.
And we ask the court to adhere to that dichotomy. I welcome the court's questions.
Well Mr. Yunikowski, the government seems to be arguing, making a simple point. How can it be considered supervised released when this per s the
Your Honor, I completely understand the intuitive force of the government's argument that the essence of supervised release is being supervised, and if a person absconds, they're just not being serving the sentence at all, in the same way as a prison escapee isn't serving the sentence at all. But ultimately, although I understand the intuitive force of that argument at first blush, I don't think it carries the day. Because the government has government's arguments has a counterintuitive component of its own. Which is that it requires believing that not only was Ms. Rico subject to the conditions of supervised release during the entire EPSCOMIN period, but she actually violated those very conditions during that period.
warranting her increased sentence. So it just seems to me almost tautologically if Miss Rico violated the conditions of supervised release, she must have been serving the very sentence that imposed those conditions of supervised release. I I do understand the intuition underlying the government's argument today that it just doesn't really make sense that a person should get credit when they've absconded. I I get that. But I think that one point that really blunts the intuitive force of the government's position is that both parties agree that ultimately the absconder should be deprived of credit for the time spent absconding. The sole question between the parties today. is very narrow. It is how that deprivation of credit should be effectuated.
So the way we understand the Sentencing Reform Act, if a warrant as issues based on the abscomment as occurred in this case, then once the person is apprehended, even after the term expires, the person can be brought before the sentence in court, and then the judge revokes supervised release and strips the person of all credit for time served during the abscomment period. So essentially the judge, rather than stopping the clock, the clock keeps going. and then the clock is rewound back to the beginning.
But is it really a credit system, Mr Yunukowski? I guess I I I'm I was a little confused by the government's suggestion um even at the beginning of its brief. that what's happening in the supervised release world is that the court is um depriving the individual of credit for supervised release.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central question the Court is asked to decide in Rico v. United States?
0:00–6:54
2
How does the Sentencing Reform Act’s text and history shape the argument against fugitive tolling?
6:54–13:18
3
Why does the government claim that Ms. Rico was still serving supervised release while she was absconded?
13:18–20:47
4
What is the proposed “revocation” mechanism for handling violations that occur during abscondment?
20:47–27:52
5
How do the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits differ on the definition of abscondment?
27:52–33:51
6
What policy concerns arise if a supervisee can wait out the term by fleeing?
33:51–40:57
7
How do hypothetical scenarios (e.g., comatose supervisee, state‑prison overlap) illustrate the limits of the statute?
40:57–48:27
8
What is the final position of counsel and what outcome are they asking the Court to adopt?
48:27–54:33