Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc. (17-1625)

argument 17-1625

Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc.

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 0m 6 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 7 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the legal definition of “costs” under federal law and why does it matter?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument next this morning, Case 17-1625, Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle, USA. Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr.

Daniel J. Perry 0:10

Chief Justice, and may I please the Court. The term costs is a term of art in Federal law. This Court has held as much three times in Crawford Fitting, in Casey, and in Murphy. It is defined in Section 1920 of Title XXVIII. And the Court also has held that three times in those three same cases. In the Taniguchi case, the Court's most recent decision in this line, the Court emphasized that costs in Federal law does not have its ordinary meaning, but rather has this specialized meaning. Well, what about full costs? I mean, that's the issue, right? Your Honor, it is. Congress can, of course, override the default definition, and when it does so, it must do explicitly. We have here two words, full costs. We actually agree, my friend Mr. Clement and I, on full.

Daniel J. Perry 1:01

It means all or all that can be contained or complete or something of that nature. The dispute is on costs because just as the full moon doesn't tell us anything about Mars and Venus, full costs, we submit, doesn't tell the Court anything about fees and expenses. And Congress has been careful in separating out those concepts, and this Court has been careful in separating them out. Murphy, the case that involved costs under the IDEA, specifically contrasted the word costs with the word expenses and said expenses is open-ended and might include travel expenses and salaries and so forth, whereas costs, we know, are these things under Section 1920. And in Murphy, the Court told all of us, the lower courts and the Bar and Congress, what it takes to override that presumption.

Daniel J. Perry 1:49

The Court said, and this is a quote from page 301, No statute will be construed as authorizing the taxation of witness fees as costs unless the statute refers explicitly to witness fees. So here in Section 505, Your Honors, we have a statute that does not refer explicitly to witness fees and under a plain application of Murphy cannot authorize witness

Elena Kagan 2:11

fees. Mr. Perry, I understand all that case law. I think your adversary would argue, number one, that full costs in the Copyright Act predated both the definitional inclusion of costs in the federal statutes and that it had a history, a meaning, independent of what happened later. You haven't addressed how you get rid of that independent meaning argument. Number two, I think your adversary pointed us to three statutes of many that have the word full cost. Give me a meaning to those three statutes that would give effect to the word full.

Daniel J. Perry 3:07

Justice Sotomayor, if I can take those in reverse order. Full costs we submit means all costs. And let me contrast that with Section — But

Elena Kagan 3:13

it's discretionary under both the Copyright Act now and under the statute.

Daniel J. Perry 3:16

Yes, Your Honor. But in Crawford Fitting, the Court said the discretion is the on-off switch, under 54D, whether or not to give costs. That is the discretion. And let me contrast — The Government

Elena Kagan 3:25

hasn't accepted that yet,

Daniel J. Perry 3:27

though. Well, Section 2412, which this Court identified in the Baker-Botts case as the clearest example of a cost statute that overrides the presumption — says that costs in a government case can be awarded in whole or in part. Congress understands that concept, whereas in a copyright case, they're awarded full costs. It means all costs. And we know from history that that's what courts did. And we also know, to go back to your first part of your question, Your Honor, is that courts did not award any non-taxable expenditures. From 1831 to 1976, there are 858 copyright cases awarding costs. Not one case has ever awarded any cost not on a statutory schedule under either state law or federal law. That tells the Court that our construction is correct historically, and my opponent's construction has no historical support.

Daniel J. Perry 4:18

There is not a single case that has ever read the statute the way the Ninth Circuit read it in the 20th century Fox News. In fact, that is the first case in the history of the United States

Elena Kagan 4:27

— accounted for those 800 cases?

Daniel J. Perry 4:35

Your Honor, we don't have them all listed out.