Rivers v. Guerrero (23-1345)

argument 23-1345

Rivers v. Guerrero

Supreme Court of the United States 51 min 8 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 1 month ago official recording ↗

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What is the Court’s view on allowing new exculpatory evidence during a first habeas appeal?

John G. Roberts 0:01

We'll hear argument next in Case 23-1345, Rivers v. Guerrero. Mr. Brulein.

Unknown 0:08

Mr. Chief Justice, it may please the Court. Congress did not slam the door on exculpatory evidence that emerges while a prisoner's first habeas case is on appeal. Outside of habeas, there's always been a pathway to bring late-breaking claims to an appellate court's attention, and historically, habeas was no different. The near-uniform practice in the decades before EDPA was to consider such claims on the merits as part and parcel of a prisoner's first habeas case without a word about successive litigation. Congress enacted EDPA against that backdrop, and as Bannister tells us, it did not redefine what counts as successive. The other side's rule is unmoored from text and history, and it also comes at a cost.

Unknown 0:58

Viable constitutional claims that would have warranted habeas relief will fall through the cracks under their rule. That means every claim of sentencing error, every claim of structural error, and every Brady or Napoo claim that doesn't show innocence by clear and convincing evidence. The reason those claims don't fly under 2244 is that Congress decided the state's interest in repose outweighs the interest in getting those claims right. but the other side has never explained why they're entitled to repose while they're still defending the conviction on appeal. And you're not going to hear an explanation this morning. The small universe of cases where our rule makes a difference is the universe of cases where both the district court and the court of appeals agree that a new claim deserves its day in court.

Unknown 1:52

Those cases will be rare, but when they arise, EDPA does not strip district courts of the power to consider new evidence that would warrant habeas relief. The lower courts here made a threshold jurisdictional error and so never reached the merits or any procedural issues. This Court should reverse and remand. I welcome your questions. How would you define second and successive? Well, I would define it, Justice Thomas, based on the history, because Bannister says that You look at the history? Post-EDPA, how would you define it? Post-EDPA, I would say that a second or successive petition is something that in 1996, when Congress used that phrase, ordinary members of the bar would have recognized as settled is second or successive.

Unknown 2:37

And then EDPA says we look at the purposes behind, I'm sorry, Bannister says we look at the purposes behind the statute, judicial economy, piecemeal litigation, hastening finality. And Bannister tells us that that's how you look at it. And this case, I think, is easier than Bannister or Gonzalez because the statute itself answers that. Here we have Congress specifically considering how amendments should work in habeas. And Congress says amendments in habeas work just like amendments in ordinary civil litigation. And Congress said that there's a small sliver of amendments that are subject to the second or successive rules, and only those.

Clarence Thomas 3:14

Don't

Unknown 3:14

we,

Clarence Thomas 3:15

Norm, in the mine run cases, consider second time to be second and successive?

Unknown 3:21

So, Justice Thomas, if I were just looking at the phrase, I would say yes. That's how I would look at second or successive. But this Court has said second or successive is a term of art. And so all I'm saying today is what this Court said in Bannister, which is that we look at the history, and the purposes. And again, I think this case is easier than Bannister because we have a statutory hook. And going to that statutory hook, 2242 gives us the general rule, and then 2266B3B gives us the only exception. Congress specifically thought about which amendments should be subject to the rules governing second or successive petitions, and it said in 2266B3B, It's only this tiny sliver filed by prisoners on death row in opt-in states after the state files its answer.

Unknown 4:14

think it would disregard Congress's drafting choices to apply the rules governing second or successive petitions outside that tiny sliver. And I think my friend Mr. Garnieri is with me on that. Page 17 of their brief, they say 2266B3B, that's the exception, and then other amendments follow the federal rules.