Rosemond v. United States (12-895)
argument 12-895Rosemond v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
53 min
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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Transcript
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What is the core legal principle of aiding and abetting discussed at the start of the argument?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case twelve eight ninety five Roseman versus United States. Mr. Elwib?
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. It has long been a bedrock principle of American law that aiding at abetting liability requires proof that an accomplice act with purposeful intent to facilitate or encourage the crime of conviction and that mere knowing assistance is insufficient.
Do you uh uh agree that the jury could find the defendant guilty of the firearms charge under a proper instruction. In other words, was there sufficient evidence so that if a proper instruction were given Uh there could have been a conviction.
Uh even if the I think in this particular case, even if the uh jury had been given a proper instruction, uh it would have been a difficult charge to make out because uh the government never really argued facilitation after getting knowledge of the firearm. There was never evidence of foreknowledge, the government never asserted evidence of fire. Well
I guess we can get in later to whether or not if you know a firearm is being carried and if you then facilitate the commission of the underlying felony by driving the car, uh participating in the transaction, whether that's sufficient. But let me ask you this. Um Would th the instruction uh that was given, which is a JA one hundred ninety six Would would it be okay if paragraph one Um the defendant knew his cohort used a firearm. Uh the I think there is a real problem with that because it's retrospective. Um would the instruction have been sufficient if you said the defendant knew his cohort would use Or was carrying. Would
that change it? Well I think at least that would have required foreknowledge. Um but I think it would still have been problematic because it would only have required knowing facilitation. And courts traditionally have required intentional facilitation. That is if they intend to further the crime.
You do not agree then that uh If you know that there's going that there's a bank robbery afoot and you're Uh Cooperating in that, you're you're you're the uh the wheel man. Uh and you also know that the you know that the people who are conducting the bank robbery are carrying firearms. You say that there's no criminal liability for the firearms. Unless you intended them to use the firearms. Is that your
i it's our position that you could infer from the fact that you are assisting a transaction involving the But knowledge is not itself that would
protect its own question. But the question is what what what does the jury have to find? I know they could I know what they can infer. But the question from Justice Scalia Yes. You're the you drive the you drive the the the car, you know firearms are are there and might be used. Is that sufficient? And that's his question.
I I think that that would be that would support a verdict. That would support a a verdict. The only question Well wait, you're
you're it would support a verdict.
That's correct. But the question is whether you don't even have to be a little bit of a
let's assume there's a lot of evidence that he didn't really want them to use firearms. That there's no way you can say he intended them to use but he knew that they had firearms.
And I think that you could conclude from that that his purpose in assuming that's No, no, you can't. It's my
hypothetical. And and you cannot include from that there's so much other evidence. Uh this this man hates firearms. He does not like firearms. There's no way he could have intended them to use firearms, but he knew they had firearms.
You know, I hate to be accused of resisting the hypothetical because in that in that in that case I don't think it matters whether you have this subjective desire, like you think, Boy, I sure wish those firearms weren't involved. But because at that point your goal is to facilitate and make sure that this uh bank with the gun ex suc succeeds the the whole thing with the gun. So you don't have to
ent you don't have to
But that is your purp we would say that that is the purpose in facilitating.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the core legal principle of aiding and abetting discussed at the start of the argument?
0:01–6:56
2
How do the parties define the role of foreknowledge versus purposeful intent in firearm‑related offenses?
6:56–13:49
3
What hypothetical scenarios are used to illustrate when knowledge of a gun creates liability?
13:49–20:30
4
How does the debate address whether the jury must find intent to facilitate the gun’s use?
20:30–26:37
5
What issues are raised about the adequacy and wording of the jury instructions on firearm facilitation?
26:37–32:58
6
How do the arguments differ on charging the defendant with possession of ammunition versus the firearm itself?
32:58–39:36
7
Why do the counsel argue that the alleged error is more than harmless and warrants plain‑error review?
39:36–46:47
8
What conclusions do the parties draw about the proper standard for aiding‑and‑abetting liability in this case?
46:47–53:26