Rotkiske v. Klemm (18-328)
argument 18-328Rotkiske v. Klemm
Supreme Court of the United States
57 min
4 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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What is the central dispute over the FDCPA’s statute‑of‑limitations language?
We'll hear argument next in case eighteen three hundred and
twenty eight, Rodkiski versus Klem. Mr. Gann? Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. While this case is about the FDCPA, it is also fundamentally about the relationship between this Court and Congress. That relationship has long been governed in part by two important presumptions relevant here first, that Congress legislates against the backdrop of the common law, and second, that Congress legislates aware of this Court's decisions. When Congress enacted the FDCPA in nineteen seventy seven, this Court had long ago adopted a common law rule, eventually known as the Discovery Rule, applicable to cases of fraud and concealment. Citing to and quoting the Bailey decision of this court from eighteen seventy five in Holmberg in nineteen forty six, this court stated that it had long ago adopted as its own the old chancery rule that where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run.
Until the fraud is discovered, though there will be no special circumstance or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party. The court then continued in Holmberg explaining unequivocally this equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of limitation and added even those were quote an explicit statute of limitation for bringing suit, close quote. The United States concedes, as it has in prior cases, that there is a common law discovery rule applicable to fraud and concealment. In the decision below, the Third Circuit never mentioned the Holmberg case. Its analysis began and ended with two words in section eight hundred thirteen D violation occurred.
The third circuit understood that those two words by implication, not expressly, but by implication, that's at appendix page eight. displaced the common law discovery rule applicable to fraud. In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit deployed what I believe is a false dichotomy. What the Third Circuit described on the one hand is an occurrence rule and on the other hand a common law discovery rule. And in the view of the Third Circuit, If a s Congress deploys in a statute a so called occurrence rule, a common law discovery rule is presumed to be displaced. The Third Circuit cited no decision of this Court in setting forth this dichotomy between an occurrence rule and a common law discovery rule.
That analysis is at page six of the appendix. That conclusion of the Third Circuit is also in opposition to this Court's decision in nineteen eighteen in the exploration case, which is discussed at length in our brief in the briefs of the other parties. There, that is, I think, fairly characterized as an occurrence rule. The statute in exploration ran from the date of issuance of a land patent. So that was a date certain tied to facts. That in under the theory of the Third Circuit and my friends is an occurrence rule, and there the court determined that the common law discovery rule should apply.
Mr. Gantt um You keep saying fraud and self concealing. as if they're alternative rules. Um I s I think of there being multiple equitable doctrines equitable tolling, equitable Gestapo. and what I call the self concealing fraud. which was the one mentioned in an exploration argued by the government in Gabelli. and in other cases. Um Are you creating a fourth? That that it that every case, every federal statute inherently says for whatever reason if you didn't discover the fraud Equity could let you have a discovery rule?
No, I'm we are not intending to proffer a rule. In fact, what we are attempting to do is advance the application of the already established rule, the Bailey Homeburg rule.
Of footnote five. in the third circuits. opinion. Because four of the I guess there are justices or judges there. Um Judges. would have remanded to allow the district court to consider whether he would be entitled to rely on this doctrine being the self concealing rule.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central dispute over the FDCPA’s statute‑of‑limitations language?
0:00–8:56
2
How do the parties differentiate between an “occurrence rule” and the common‑law discovery rule?
8:56–15:40
3
What is the “self‑concealing fraud” doctrine and how does it relate to the Bailey‑Holmberg rule?
15:40–20:58
4
Why do the speakers argue that equitable tolling is distinct from the discovery rule?
20:58–28:17
5
How does the Court’s statutory‑interpretation framework determine if Congress displaced the discovery rule?
28:17–34:39
6
What factual allegations about false affidavits of service underpin the fraud claim in this case?
34:39–42:02
7
Why do the parties claim the issue of equitable relief was waived and should not be decided on remand?
42:02–49:35
8
What are the parties’ final arguments on whether the FDCPA includes a broad discovery rule or not?
49:35–57:20