Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran (16-534)
argument 16-534Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran
Supreme Court of the United States
45 min
4 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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What statutory changes did Congress make in 2008 to address foreign sovereign immunity for terrorism victims?
You'll hear argument next in case sixteen five thirty four, Rubin versus the Islamic Republic of
Iran. Mr. Perlan. Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. In two thousand eight Congress comprehensively Overhaul the terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity To close gaps. that had for years allowed foreign terrorist states to thumb their noses at US judgments, finding them liable for acts of terrorism. Are their victims? were drawn into a long, bitter and often futile search for scarce assets that would be subject to execution under the exceedingly narrow commercial exception of foreign sovereign immunity. A centrepiece of that legislation is section sixteen ten G. That provision provides that American terrorism victims can execute their judgments upon the property of a foreign state that is subject
That uh um Against which a de a judgment has been entered under sixteen oh five A. and it makes available the property of the states Agencies and instrumentalities. If
it's a as provided in the section.
as provided in this section. The question is what that what that provision means. The respondents would have the Court delete the three words between the word execution The words as provided in this section. What it actually says is that that The property is subject to execution upon that judgment as provided in this section.
We know what that that Congress wanted to do away with the what they call the bank check. factors and this statute was written Perfectly to do just that. you say it does something more.
It has to do more, Your Honor.
I mean why does it have to? What the the statute did is it made more assets available 'cause you didn't have to worry whether it was the state itself and instrumentality of the state and agency. The the property of any of those entities was available. So it swelled the assets that would be available. But it didn't say anything, not a word about immunity.
Well th there's two questions here. It doesn't say anything about immunity, but those are magic words. It does say that the property is subject to execution.
Magic words under A and B. In sixteen ten in A and B, Congress knew how directly to say property is not or is subject immune from attachment. But it used something very different here. Rather it says that property is, quote, subject to a attachment as provided in this section. Those are two very distinct formulations.
They are different. Subsections A and B were part of the original Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act. from nineteen seventy six. There were other amendments since then. If you look at subsection F one which the President has waived says shall be subject to execution. The the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, which is codified as a note to subsect to Section sixteen ten. also says shall be subject to execution to to to execution of So the language when when Congress sat down to write subsection G, it was looking at the other terrorism exceptions to execution immunity that it had already passed, and those were F and TRIA, and it modelled G after after those sections.
Can they uh execute Uh your clients on the embassy? So on the uh uniform uh on the uniforms that the uh uh people in the embassy wear, on on the papers that the ambassador keeps in his desk, if in fact you read As provided in this section, the answer is no, if you read it to include 'cause it has to be commercial. All right? Under your reading, where those read words must mean something else. Can't they do it?
They cannot. Subsection section sixteen oh nine says that Section sixteen ten, execution under sixteen ten is subject to international agreements, like the Vienna Convention, which would protect uh diplomatic property. And so Section sixteen eleven protects military assets, certain central bank ac uh assets. Congress, when they enacted sixteen ten G. They did not completely abrogate foreign sovereign immunity for terrorist states. They wanted to provide a remedy for the victims, they wanted to punish and deter the terrorist states, but at the same time kind of recognized that Iran and North Korea
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What statutory changes did Congress make in 2008 to address foreign sovereign immunity for terrorism victims?
0:00–5:17
2
How does Section 16‑10 G define “as provided in this section” and why is that wording critical to the case?
5:17–11:11
3
Why do the parties argue that the “as provided” language either expands or limits execution against foreign‑state assets?
11:11–16:22
4
What is the role of the “commercial use” limitation in Sections 16‑10 A, B, F and how does it affect the Rubin case?
16:22–21:51
5
How do the respondents interpret Section 16‑10 G as a veil‑piercing mechanism versus a direct execution provision?
21:51–27:23
6
Why do the petitioners claim that cultural and historic artifacts are exempt from execution under Section 16‑9?
27:23–32:58
7
What precedent cases (e.g., Banck, Helmerick, Berti) are cited to support each side’s reading of the statute?
32:58–40:09
8
What is the Supreme Court’s ultimate question about congressional intent and the balance between sovereign immunity and victims’ remedies?
40:09–45:16