Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter (11-551)
argument 11-551Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter
Supreme Court of the United States
57 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
official recording ↗
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What is the funding dispute at the heart of Salazar v. Ramah Navajo?
We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11551, Salazar, Secretary of the Interior v. Ramanavaho Chapter. Mr. Freeman.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. The funding dispute in this case is the result of two distinctive features of the ISDA statutory scheme. On the one hand, Congress has required the Secretary of the Interior to accept every self-determination contract proposed by an Indian tribe, provided that the The contract meets the requirements of the Act without regard to the total number of contracts into which the Secretary must enter. On the other hand, in every fiscal year since 1994, Congress has enacted an explicit statutory cap on the amount of money that the Secretary may use to pay contract support costs under the ISDA and under those contracts. Now, we think under the circumstances, Congress intended the Secretary to resolve these — the
relationship between these provisions in exactly the way that the Secretary has.
Excuse me, but could the Secretary have done anything else?
I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you.
Could the Secretary have done anything else? There's an allegation that the Secretary, in fact, pays some contractors more than their pro rata share, that it pays some nothing, so that it's, in effect, acting — I don't want to use the word arbitrarily, but acting in whatever its best interest is. So what protects the contracting party from that —
MR. Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE BREYER- — from that conduct, assuming it were to be clear.
MR. Yes, Your Honor. Well, the Secretary has promulgated a formal nationwide policy — JUSTICE
BREYER- Says it has a policy. MR. Yes. JUSTICE BREYER- The allegation is that it's not following it, that it's choosing to pay some people more than others.
MR. Right. And let me address that. The allegations is, I think, at page 9 to 10 of the respondent's brief. Those allegations are, as a factual matter, false. They give a couple of examples where 0 percent contract support costs were paid. One of those examples is a contract where it had been entered into in that particular year. New contracts are paid under a different appropriation. Another example is they give a case of a tribe that was paid 352 percent of its contract support costs. And let me explain. I think it's important to
understand how — was not the one that was applicable to the years in question.
MR. That's right. At the time of the district court's ruling in this case, from 1994 until about 2006, the Secretary followed a uniform pro-rata distribution methodology according to the needs of each of the individual tribes. Now, that's what we thought the tribes wanted. We thought that was the fairest way to do it.
JUSTICE BREYER- All within the dollar amount that was specified by the Congress in the not to exceed language?
MR. That's exactly right, Your Honor, yes. Each tribe has an amount of need. This is the amount that is estimated as a negotiated figure between the Secretary and each tribe. And it is undisputed that the amounts that Congress has appropriated have never been enough to pay 100 percent of each of those figures for each member of the responding
class. JUSTICE BREYER. Didn't we have similar language in Cherokee Nation? And didn't we say that that language in Cherokee Nation, which was in the general appropriation statute, although not in each contract — didn't mean that the Secretary could refuse to pay.
MR. No, Your Honor, we did not have similar language in Cherokee if you mean the Appropriations Acts. It was under the same — MR.
No, I don't mean the Appropriations Act. I mean the general statute that governed this program.
MR. No, that's right. And maybe it would be helpful if I could
— MR. So why does it mean one thing there and mean something else in the Appropriations Act?
MR. I may not be understanding Your Honor's question, but I think it might be helpful if I explain what was at issue in Cherokee. In Cherokee, the government was not in this court making appropriations clause arguments. We were here making a very different argument.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the funding dispute at the heart of Salazar v. Ramah Navajo?
0:00–8:00
2
Can the Secretary of the Interior act differently under the ISDA statutory scheme?
8:00–15:31
3
How does the Ferris Doctrine apply to the government’s contract‑support obligations?
15:31–23:51
4
What does the “not‑to‑exceed” language mean for tribal contracts and appropriations?
23:51–29:51
5
Do tribes have a contractual right to a pro‑rata share of limited funds?
29:51–36:43
6
How could Congress restructure the funding scheme to avoid the current shortfall?
36:43–44:58
7
What are the arguments for and against letting the Judgment Fund cover contract breaches?
44:58–51:26
8
What is the Court’s likely resolution of the caps, allocation, and tribal rights?
51:26–57:46