Salinas v. Texas (12-246)
argument 12-246Salinas v. Texas
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 0m
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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What is the Fifth Amendment rule on using a suspect’s silence in non‑custodial police interviews?
We'll hear argument next in Case 12-246, Salinas v. Texas. Mr. Fisher.
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. The Fifth Amendment prohibits using a person's silence during a noncustodial police interview against him at trial. And nothing about the specific facts of this case give this Court cause to refrain from applying that rule here. To the contrary, the State's closing argument in this case, urging the jury to find Mr. Salinas guilty because, quote, an innocent person would have denied law enforcement's accusations, strikes at the core of everything the Griffin Rule and indeed the Fifth Amendment is designed to prohibit. It evokes an inquisitorial system of justice. It effectively shifts the burden of proof onto the defendant. And it demeans individual dignity by conscripting the defendant as a product of his own demise.
Now, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals resisted this logic and held that the Fifth Amendment didn't apply because there was supposedly no compulsion in this case, in the sense that there was no physical or psychological coercion of the kind that's inherent in custody. But the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals simply misunderstood the nature of a Griffin claim and the nature of the compulsion. The compulsion that Mr. Salinas faced was when the police asked him the question about ballistics evidence, there was nothing he could do to avoid supplying the State with incriminating evidence that it could use against him. If he answered the question — Why isn't it like the Berg — is it Berghoof's case?
There was a case of someone who was given Miranda warnings, and even so, the Court said he was silent. He didn't invoke the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, his silence can be commented on. No, that's not the holding of the Burgess case, with all due respect. The Burgess case was about whether his subsequent statements could be used against him. This Court didn't hold that his silence that preceded those statements could be used against him, and indeed, that would be contrary to to Miranda itself in footnote 37, where the Court said, if somebody stands mute in a custodial setting in the face of law enforcement accusations that would not —
JUSTICE BREYER. What's the law? What is — I mean, look, Joe Smith leaves a blank on part of his tax return. The IRS gets it. Later it turns out to be relevant, and the prosecutor wants to say, hey, he left this blank. Okay? Now, Griffin doesn't apply, right? If the — I mean, isn't it — you're not going to say that any — any time you refuse to tell the government anything, and later out it turns to be relevant to a criminal prosecution, that that's taken as an invocation of the Fifth Amendment. I mean, do you want to go that far?
No, I don't need to. Okay. Then you need a
line. This case is — Then what is — then you need a line.
Well, it's — So
where is the — there's the tax case. Then we have a case they're selling tickets to the policeman's ball. And somebody comes to the door and the policeman says, hey, I haven't seen you around before. And he doesn't answer. Okay? Okay. That's probably not an invocation. And then we have the clear line, which in custody. And now you want to extend that line. And so what I want to know, if I follow you and extend it, what line do I draw?
Well, it's sufficient to decide this case to say that a non-custodial police interview during the investigation of a crime, where they're interviewing somebody about who is, as the State concedes, a suspect in a crime. Now, it may well be that Griffin extends a little bit further. And remember, the Solicitor General, at least, agrees that Griffin applies in a non-custodial setting. Well, but it's well settled that when you're examining the witness and he suddenly says, I don't want any more questions, that he's waived if you're in court, if you're examining a witness on this thing. So against that background, suppose in this case the facts were just about the same and the police said, what would you do if we matched the shotgun sales?
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Fifth Amendment rule on using a suspect’s silence in non‑custodial police interviews?
0:01–7:27
2
How do the parties compare the Griffin rule with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in Burgess?
7:27–15:09
3
Why does the government argue that an explicit invocation of the Fifth Amendment is required in non‑custodial settings?
15:09–23:08
4
Can a defendant’s physical demeanor (e.g., nervousness, shuffling feet) be used as evidence of guilt?
23:08–30:16
5
What is the difference between custodial and non‑custodial interrogations for Fifth Amendment protection?
30:16–37:11
6
How do the justices evaluate hypothetical scenarios where a suspect answers most questions but remains silent on one?
37:11–43:48
7
What is the circuit split regarding Doyle v. Ohio and its application after a Miranda waiver?
43:48–53:16
8
What are the petitioners’ final arguments for adopting a rule that does not require an express invocation?
53:16–1:01:05