San Antonio v. Hotels.com, L.P. (20-334)
argument 20-334San Antonio v. Hotels.com, L.P.
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 10m
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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Who has the authority to decide Rule 39 E costs – the district court or the appellate court?
We will hear argument first this morning in case twenty three three four, San Antonio versus hotels dot com.
Mr.
Geyser.
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Rule thirty-nine authorizes district courts to exercise discretion in denying or reducing taxable costs under Rule thirty nine E. And the Fifth Circuit's contrary position ignores the rule's plain language, makes nonsense of its structure, invites a host of obvious practical problems, and if adopted here, would dramatically upset settled practice in every single jurisdiction nationwide. including ironically in the Fifth Circuit itself. Respondents have now wisely conceded that Rule thirty nine E costs are discretionary. The only question is which court has the power to exercise that discretion? We say the district court because Rule thirty nine E expressly says that Rule thirty nine E costs are taxable in the District Court.
That clause embodies a permissive term in making a textual assignment to the district court, not the appellate court, and it does so against the explicit backdrop of the provisions like Section 1920 that delegate textual discretion over the same overlapping costs to the district court. This straightforward design pushes down collateral fact bound issues to the tribunal that is best equipped to take evidence, make a record, resolve factual disputes, and address these new issues in the first instance. Now respondents say that Rule thirty nine vests only the appellate court with discretion, but their only hook for that belief is Rule thirty nine A, which is the rule's only provision that provides any role for the appellate panel.
That rule, by its express terms, dictates only against whom costs are assessed. It says nothing about what those costs should be. Under the rule's design, the panel doesn't have access to the relevant information at the time of the subsection A determination. The panel doesn't have a formal cost request. It doesn't have any relevant evidence, it doesn't have a record on costs because there is no record on costs, and it doesn't know the opposing party's objections or the reason certain costs should be denied or reduced. A court cannot intelligently exercise discretion without access to the relevant information and the rule is specifically designed for the relevant information to come out after the rule thirty nine A determination is made.
Mr. Geyser, um Sir this is a matter that's dealt with in the local rules. Um and perhaps my information is is dated, but it it seemed to me that if you practice before the court on a regular basis you'd know what the rules and the customs were and if not you would ask the clerk and uh he or she would tell you. And I think what they would tell you is one of two things. First they say we deal with that problem up here, you know, haven't you read Rule thirty nine A? And if there's a dispute, I'll go ask the writing judge uh what he or she wants to do. And if there's still gonna be a fight, we'll send it down to the district court. Uh or the clerk is going to tell you, y you go down to the district court, haven't you read Rule thirty nine E?
Um and if it uh uh there's still a fight down there, uh th they'll bring it up here. Um but it seems to me that that your rule would sort of uh standardize all those local practices which as far as I can tell haven't really been uh a a problem because you say the Court of Appeals has no pr no authority over this and it has to go to the district court in the first instance. Is that right?
Well we we say it has to go to the district court and so does the Fifth Circuit. Uh if you look to page uh ten of the petition appendix, the the appellate court in this in this case said that Rule thirty nine E costs are properly sought uh before the district court. It's totally unclear then how the appellate court can exercise discretion when the cost requests for those costs under the Fifth Circuit's own practice uh doesn't even arise at the appellate level. They have no idea what those costs will be.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
Who has the authority to decide Rule 39 E costs – the district court or the appellate court?
0:00–9:46
2
Why does the Fifth Circuit’s practice differ from other circuits on cost discretion?
9:46–17:45
3
What due‑process problems arise when the appellate court lacks factual information on costs?
17:45–25:30
4
How should parties raise objections to supersedeas‑bond costs – at the appellate level or later in district court?
25:30–34:44
5
What procedural vehicles exist for raising cost‑related equitable arguments (merits brief, rehearing petition, etc.)?
34:44–43:51
6
How does Rule 39 A interact with Rule 39 E in determining who pays and who taxes costs?
43:51–51:28
7
What is the role of Rule 62 in controlling bond‑cost reasonableness before they become taxable?
51:28–1:00:04
8
What is the Court’s ultimate conclusion on whether the district court should have a second round of discretion on appellate costs?
1:00:04–1:10:39