San Francisco v. EPA (23-753)
argument 23-753San Francisco v. EPA
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 37m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 1 month ago
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Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What statutory authority does Section 301(b)(1)(C) give EPA over water‑quality standards?
We'll hear argument now in case twenty three seven fifty three, the city and county of San Francisco versus the Environmental Protection Agency. Ms. Steely?
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Section 301 B1C of the Clean Water Act assigns EPA the job of setting the effluent limitations necessary to meet and implement water quality standards. The water quality standards are not the limitations themselves. Instead, they set the goals for the water body. EPA must translate those goals into discharge limitations. The generic prohibitions fail this task. As Judge Collins explained below, the generic prohibitions erase the distinction between water quality standards and discharge limitations, making them one and the same. The generic prohibitions revived the very cause or contribute standard Congress repealed. And they do not function as discharge limitations.
As the Second Circuit recognized, they add nothing that tells a permit holder how to control its discharges. EPA claims it uses the generic prohibitions as a backstop, an insurance policy against changing circumstances. But the Clean Water Act already gives EPA all the tools it needs to address uncertainty. EPA can reopen, modify, or terminate a permit when conditions change, and it can exercise its statutory authority to protect public welfare in emergencies. What EPA cannot do is expose permit holders to liability based on receiving water conditions it cannot control. The generic prohibitions are also inconsistent with the Act's permit shield. The Shield protects permit holders from liability as long as they comply with their permit terms.
But by imposing indeterminate requirements, the generic prohibitions prevent permit holders from relying on the SHIELD's protections. San Francisco is therefore exposed to crushing criminal and civil penalties, even when it otherwise complies with its three hundred page permit. I welcome the court's questions.
Uh in phase and in in in your permit, uh phase one, uh doesn't that contain a narrative limitation?
So San Francisco's permit is a phase two permit, so we're not subject to the CSO policy for phase one. But um phase one describes a narrative condition. The generic prohibition our our concern about the generic prohibitions is not that they are narrative. It's perfectly fine for EPA to use conditions that are narrative, narrative water quality based effluent limitations. And that's exactly what the CSO control sorry, the CSO control policy requires um in even an EPA's own guidance, it describes what's required under um Phase one and it describes that as a narrative water quality based effect.
uh permit what is at bottom the problem.
What at bottom is the problem is that permit holders don't know what they need to do to comply. We know how to comply with a three hundred pages of our permit, which tells us our discharge limitations that we need to achieve. The problem with the generic prohibitions is that they don't tell us what in addition that we need to do and if I could provide an example of that. One of California's water quality standards is Um No objectionable algae bloom should form in the water body. San Francisco doesn't know how it must control its discharges to prevent that condition from forming in the water body. And we can't know because whether a condition will form in the water body will necessarily depend on what other permit holders or other non-point sources are adding to the water body and the flow of the water itself.
What San Francisco can control is our own discharges. We cannot control the receiving water condition.
Are the water quality standards um in state law. I I thought uh that the EPA permits were just incorporating obligations that already existed in state law. Am I wrong about that?
Um I I think that's not quite your correct, Your Honor. Um The water quality standards set the goal for the water body, but they aren't self executing. They have to be put into a permit. Um what's what three oh one B one C requires is that EPA Meet and implement the water quality standards, which means translating them into a sp a permit limitation.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What statutory authority does Section 301(b)(1)(C) give EPA over water‑quality standards?
0:00–11:17
2
How do narrative water‑quality‑based effluent limitations work in San Francisco’s permit?
11:17–22:35
3
When can EPA modify or terminate a permit under its emergency powers?
22:35–34:01
4
Are the generic prohibitions in the permit arbitrary and capricious?
34:01–45:16
5
What are the potential civil and criminal penalties for non‑compliance?
45:16–59:07
6
How would limiting generic prohibitions affect general permits and small businesses?
59:07–1:12:25
7
Does the permit scheme provide fair notice to regulated entities?
1:12:25–1:24:09
8
What relief is San Francisco seeking from the Supreme Court?
1:24:09–1:37:32