Sekhar v. United States (12-357)

argument 12-357

Sekhar v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States 58 min 6 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 5 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the Hobbes Act’s definition of “property” and why does it matter?

John G. Roberts 0:01

We'll hear argument uh this morning first in case twelve three fifty seven, SACAR versus United States. Mr. Clement.

Mr. Clement 0:09

Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court, the crime of extortion under the Hobbes Act, like the related crimes of larceny, burglary, and embezzlement, is at bottom a property crime. Accordingly, understanding the scope of obtainable property under the Hobbes Act is critical to deciding the scope of the basic criminal prohibition. The government has offered you a definition of property that only a prosecutor could love, any intangible right with economic value. But that definition is fundamentally incompatible with this Court's precedence and with Congress's conscious decision in the Hobbes Act to criminalize the state New York state crime of extortion, but not the New York crime of coercion.

Anthony M. Kennedy 0:55

the verdict which is at J A one hundred forty two and it had marked that the attempt to extort was to extort the commitment You might still maybe have some causation arguments, but I assume the property argument you're about to make is just uh ir irrelevant.

Mr. Clement 1:12

Well I don't think it's irrelevant, Justice Kennedy. I would have a different argument. I think that I would stand first and foremost on this Court's decision in Cleveland, where it recognized that something like I think a commitment, certainly the video poker license Was at issue there, the court also referenced an unissued patent, and it recognized that there are things that have value once they are issued, but in the hands of the government they don't have value and therefore don't qualify as property.

Anthony M. Kennedy 1:43

what they were taking was the commissions uh that would ultimately have been generated.

Mr. Clement 1:50

Well Justice Kennedy, it might have been possible to say that what was obtained here was money. But I think if the government had prosecuted it under that theory, it would have to prove that somehow the government paid too much. I don't think it could point just to the commi commissions. And I would analogize it to the McNally case. In the McNally case, the you know there was this scheme in which various sort of friends of government officials were getting the commissions from a workmen's compensation policy. And what this court said is, well it would have been one thing if the government had come in and said that the government paid commissions that were too high or the government had received inferior quality insurance.

Mr. Clement 2:29

But what the government did there instead was sort of take the shortcut and plead that what had happened is the government had been deprived of its interest in having the honest will. So

Anthony M. Kennedy 2:38

here what the petitioner wanted were the commissions. Ultimately. Uh and you c can't commit extortion in order to get and then that's real money. Uh w w it's for the government to answer, not you. But can do you have any idea why they didn't charge that?

Mr. Clement 2:54

Well I think the reason that they didn't charge that is probably practically twofold. One is that a commitment under New York law and practice is not quite as what it sounds. It's not really a commitment. And the best evidence of that is with the last fund for this particular management company, they got a commitment from the state and there was no ultimate investment made. So there's a subsequent step down the road. So I think that's part of it. The other thing I would say is as a McNally, I think they would have had to prove that the management fees were somehow ex excessive or something like that. So they they didn't do that. They focused on this recommendation.

Anthony M. Kennedy 3:30

Well I I took you away from your argument about intangible property. Mr. Clint, just along the same lines, y what you're saying is that it still would not be extortion. Let's say somebody in your client's position runs an investment company, once an investment, once the fees that come along with that investment goes to let's say that there's a single person who gets to decide whether to make that investment and so to pay those fees. goes to that person, threatens that person with something terrible happening to him.