Shapiro v. McManus (14-990)
argument 14-990Shapiro v. McManus
Supreme Court of the United States
46 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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What is the statutory framework for convening a three‑judge district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2284?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case fourteen nine ninety, Shapiro versus McManus. Mr Kimberly?
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Section twenty two hundred and eighty four A states in plain terms that a district court of three judges shall be convened when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts. Section twenty two and eighty four B lays out the procedure for calling a three judge court when the circumstances identified in twenty two eighty four are satisfied. It it reads Upon the filing of a request for three judges, the judge to whom the request is presented shall, unless he determines that three judges are not required, immediately notify the chief judge of the circuit who shall designate two other judges. Now, although that language did not appear in the statute until the 1976 amendments, it was no more than a congress congressional recognition and codification of what was then by settle what was by then settled practice, that a complaint covered by 2284A would have initially to be referred to a single judge, that the litigants then would have to file a request for a three-judge district court.
and in turn that the single judge would have to determine whether three judges were in fact required. Now at the time that Congress enacted that long standing practice in the nineteen seventy six amendments to the Act, This Court's precedence had made clear that one basis upon which three judges are quote not required is when the claim is constitutionally insubstantial. Congress is presumed to have been aware of this Court's precedence so holding, and in the absence of a contrary indication, and here there is none, to have intended that interpretation of the words not required to be incorporated into the statute.
What if it is perfectly clear that the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment? Let's say a State legislature goes back to its pre Reynolds versus Sims uh method of uh constituting the state legislature. Does that have to be referred to a three judge court?
If it is i if the claim is obviously foreclosed by this court's precedence, then no it doesn't. The the upshot of this court's insubstantiality doctrine is that when a claim is so obviously foreclosed, it doesn't present a bona fide controversy within the meaning of Article three and therefore isn't the kind of case that has to be referred to a three judge court.
Go ahead. How do you square that with the statutory language?
Well, uh we think that's embodied in the words not required. Uh in in the two and three years before Congress inserted the key language in Section twenty two eighty four B, this court had said in Goosby that three that a three judge district court is, quote, not required when the claim is insubstantial. Maybe
Goosby was wrong. You don't think Guzby was wrong?
Well, I uh Goosby represents what had been by then uh nearly fifty years of practice, uh beginning with this court's decision in Poreski. Uh for what it's worth, I will say um I think if Gooseby is wrong we still end up winning because And
I what do you I'm sorry, why don't you
Well I I would just say I think the path of least resistance here to reversing the Fourth Circuit is not to overturn that precedent, but we certainly would be happy if the court were inclined to do that.
What do you do if your argument i in a case that might go before a three-judge court is that the court's precedence should be overruled? It is clearly foreclosed by the Court's precedence, but maybe there is a very good argument that the those precedents are haven't withstood the test of time or whatever. What happens in the U.S. This Court's precedence. I understand the Chief Justice.
So I think in that circumstance, at least according to the Goosby rule, is that the case would properly be dismissed for for lack of jurisdiction as not stating. By the
by the s by the single judge?
By the single judge court. And and if if then um this
perhaps I have some problems with that. Suppose the the
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the statutory framework for convening a three‑judge district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2284?
0:01–6:36
2
How does the Court’s “insubstantiality” doctrine limit the need for a three‑judge court?
6:36–13:33
3
What is the significance of the Goosby decision for determining when three judges are required?
13:33–20:07
4
Can a single district judge decide jurisdiction when a claim is deemed “obviously foreclosed”?
20:07–25:34
5
Why did Congress narrow the three‑judge court statute in the 1976 amendments?
25:34–30:23
6
How does the direct‑appeal provision (28 U.S.C. § 2253) affect the appellate path for three‑judge cases?
30:23–35:07
7
What are the practical implications of handling politically sensitive reapportionment cases in three‑judge courts?
35:07–40:24
8
What conclusions does the Court reach about the proper interpretation of “shall” vs. “may” in the statute?
40:24–47:11