Sheetz v. County of El Dorado (22-1074)
argument 22-1074Sheetz v. County of El Dorado
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 28m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 9 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the core dispute over the County’s impact fee in Sheets v. El Dorado?
We'll hear argument first this morning, case 22-1074, Sheets
v. the County of El Dorado. Mr. Beard. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. The County refused to give George Sheets a permit to build a home unless he paid a substantial fee to finance public road improvements. He was faced with an impossible choice, the taking of over $23,000 or the ability to use his land. Though the fee went beyond mitigation, he did submit to the fee and paid under protest. After all, the permit was worth far more than the fee. That's the same improper leveraging that led to this court's rule in Nolan, Dolan, and Kuntz that all permit exactions should be subject to heightened scrutiny. Such review is needed to ensure that the government is not committing a taking in the guise of the police power to mitigate for land use impacts.
Yet the lower court refused to apply Nolan Dolan simply because the fee came from a legislative, preset, generally applicable schedule that the county had adopted. The decision below is as wrong as it is dangerous. First, nothing in the court's exactions precedence, the takings clause, or the unconstitutional conditions doctrine justifies that broad exception. Second, it's a perversion of Nolan and Dolan to say that because an exaction is generally applicable, therefore, it requires no heightened review. The exact opposite is true. Such an exaction only amplifies the risk that the government hasn't tailored its exaction to a project's impacts. And that cries out for Nolan Dolan review. Finally, upholding the lower court's decision would just invite the government to monetize across the country all of their permit exactions and to preset legislative fees in order to escape heightened review.
The exception would swallow the rule. All permit exactions, whether monetary or otherwise generally applicable or ad hoc, should be subject to Nolan and Dolan to ensure the government doesn't take more than it is entitled to under its police power to mitigate for land use impacts. The court should reverse and remand with instructions to apply heightened review to the county's fee. I look forward to the court's
questions. Do we have to decide any more than whether Nolan-Dolan scrutiny applies to, can apply here to legislative exaction?
Justice Thomas, the Court is able to just answer the question presented, which is simply whether there's some kind of a legislative generally applicable exception to Nolan and Dolan.
If the — if Respondent concedes that, is there anything else we should do?
There's nothing for the Court to do. That is the question presented. They've essentially conceded that primary point that there is no legislative generally applicable exception.
I was
just going to say, in all of the other takings cases, there was an identical property interest that was at issue. So unless your argument is that money is property, this is a very different application of the takings clause, isn't it?
We think it's very consistent with the takings clause, and in particular with the Court's decision in Coons, where the Court held explicitly if the money demand was has a direct link to an identifiable property interest, which in that case and in this case was the land that was proposed for use, that direct link is sufficient to render the monetary demand a monetary exaction subject to Nolan and Dolan.
Well, it involves land, but they're not taking any particular property interest. They're not taking any part of the land. They're not taking an easement. It's just use to which the land is being put. You can argue it's the value of the land. And even in the other cases where we're talking about money, It's usually money in a particular pot, whether it's, you know, in the legal fees case or those sorts of situations. I don't think there's another case under Nolan and Dolan and Kuntz where what's involved is simply value as opposed to a concrete identifiable property interest.
It's true that it is Kuntz that we are relying on for that identifiable property interest link to the property demand.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the core dispute over the County’s impact fee in Sheets v. El Dorado?
0:00–12:23
2
How do the parties argue whether Nolan‑Dolan scrutiny applies to legislative exactions?
12:23–22:37
3
Why do the advocates claim the fee is not a taking under the Takings Clause?
22:37–32:15
4
Is the county’s charge a tax, a user fee, or something else entirely?
32:15–42:55
5
What role do nexus and rough proportionality play in evaluating the fee?
42:55–55:35
6
How might due‑process and equal‑protection doctrines limit the fee’s constitutionality?
55:35–1:06:27
7
What practical consequences could a ruling on this case have for local governments?
1:06:27–1:16:47
8
How do the Justices summarize their positions as the argument concludes?
1:16:47–1:28:51