Sheriff v. Gillie (15-338)
argument 15-338Sheriff v. Gillie
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 1m
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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Are special counsel considered state officers under Ohio law?
your argument first this morning in case fifteen three three eight Sharif versus Gilli. Mr Murphy.
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Given resource constraints, Ohio law has always authorized its attorney general to appoint special counsel to undertake the attorney general's duty of representing the state and the courts. While the attorney general may appoint general deputies today, special counsel remain integral to the office. For example, the office has only 15 assistant attorneys general dedicated to collecting the billions. Dollars of state debts scattered across all 88 Ohio counties. The office necessarily must rely on special counsel to be the frontline lawyers to collect these debts. Yet the Sixth Circuit in this case held both that special counsel are not attorney general officers and may not use Attorney General letterhead without risking liability under the Fair Debt Collection Practice.
Yeah. That was mistaken for two basic reasons. First, special counsel are state officers under that act, and so they fall within the government exemption designed to protect government operations. And second, special counsel's use of Attorney General Letterhead accurately conveyed their relationship to the office and furthered the purposes of the Act by putting the credibility of the office on the line. And giving it a powerful incentive to monitor special counsel when they collect these debts. So I'd like to begin first with the first question presented, the officer question. And the the the briefs have gone back and forth on what officer can mean historically and on what it should mean for the act.
I think what it should mean for the act is that the broadest conceivable definition should apply, precisely because this provision. is designed to protect government operations.
Well, I asked you about the the general structure of the act seems to be in house collectors are okay, but outside collectors, whether for private or or for government. Full under the act. But as d do I understand your view correctly that that line doesn't exist for the state, that is whether it's an in house or an outhouse. selector did equally Uh exactly.
Uh I I I agree that I I yes, you understand our position cor correctly. I do not think that the in-house, out outhouse, outside uh dichotomy makes sense for purposes of the government exemption. And here's why. The prototypical uh in the legislative history it lists sheriffs and marshals as the prototypical uh exempt debt collectors for the government, and they are always outside of the private credit. who are the judgment creditors. So there there are a core group of outside uh c collectors, the in outside of the creditor that is, who are the prototypical examples
Well why wouldn't Congress have expressed that more clearly? I mean that's a big thing that you're saying, that the state debt collectors really ought to be treated very differently, the outside debt collectors, from the private. And on the face of the statute The private and the state really are treated in exactly the same way. There are two provisions, they read identically to each other. And surely there were very clear ways. of taking out the state outside debt collectors. You could have just said state debts aren't debts for purposes of this statute or or state uh outside debt collectors aren't debt collectors for purposes of this statute. And yet Congress did none of those things. Rather Congress
adopted a set of provisions that seem perfectly parallel with respect to state and corporate entities.
So I disagree a uh uh that they're perfectly pl parallel in these ways. First, I think officer means something different than in the government context than it does in the private context. In the private context, as we cite Black's Law D dictionary, the prototypical officer is the President, the CEO, the Treasurer, high level managers. But not that's not true for the government. The prototypical officer can be ministerial officers like police officers. Well I I
understand the argument that you can read the same term two different ways, but Congress did
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
Are special counsel considered state officers under Ohio law?
0:00–7:49
2
How does the Dictionary Act define an “officer” for this case?
7:49–14:41
3
Does using Attorney General letterhead mislead consumers about who is collecting the debt?
14:41–22:54
4
Are special counsel liable for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act?
22:54–30:42
5
What historical examples support treating special counsel as officers?
30:42–38:20
6
Can the Attorney General legally appoint special counsel to collect state debts?
38:20–46:11
7
How does letterhead influence consumer perception and the risk of scams?
46:11–53:35
8
What is the Supreme Court likely to decide on the officer and letterhead questions?
53:35–1:01:38